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Abstract 
This  paper  develops  an  agency  model  of  contract  choice  in  the  hiring  of  labor  and 
then  uses  the  model  to  estimate  the  determinants  of  contract  choice  in  rural  Myanmar. 
As  a  salient  feature  relevant  for  the  agricultural  sector  in  a  low  income  country  such  as 
Myanmar,  the  agency  model  incorporates  considerations  of  food  security  and  incentive 
eﬀects.  It  is  shown  that  when,  possibly  due  to  poverty,  food  considerations  are  important 
for  employees,  employers  will  prefer  a  labor  contract  with  wages  paid  in  kind  (food)  to  one 
with  wages  paid  in  cash.  At  the  same  time,  when  output  is  responsive  to  workers’  eﬀort 
and  labor  monitoring  is  costly,  employers  will  prefer  a  contract  with  piece­rate  wages  to 
one  with  hourly  wages.  The  case  of  sharecropping  can  be  understood  as  a  combination 
of  the  two:  a  labor  contract  with  piece­rate  wages  paid  in  kind.  The  predictions  of  the 
theoretical  model  are  tested  using  a  cross­section  dataset  collected  in  rural  Myanmar 
through  a  sample  household  survey  which  was  conducted  in  2001  and  covers  diverse 
agro­ecological  environments.  The  estimation  results  are  consistent  with  the  theoretical 
predictions:  wages  are  more  likely  to  be  paid  in  kind  when  the  share  of  staple  food  in 
workers’  budget  is  higher  and  the  farmland  on  which  they  produce  food  themselves  is 
smaller;  piece­rate  wages  are  more  likely  to  be  adopted  when  work  eﬀort  is  more  diﬃcult 
to  monitor  and  the  farming  operation  requires  quick  completion. 
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Both  in  developed  and  developing  countries,  ﬁrms  and  farms  rely  on  a  variety  of  compen­
sation  policies  when  employing  workers.  But  what  determines  which  policy  is  chosen  and 
how  does  the  choice  of  compensation  policy  aﬀect  the  eﬃciency  and  equity  of  labor  transac­
tions?  This  is  a  question  that  has  been  discussed  intensively  in  the  ﬁelds  of  labor  economics 
and  development  economics,  both  because  of  the  theoretical  interest  in  modeling  this  issue 
and  because  of  its  practical  importance  for  designing  optimal  contracts.  Especially  in  de­
velopment  economics,  the  practice  of  sharecropping, a  contract  in  which  landlords  transfer 
land­use  rights  to  tenants  in  exchange  for  land  rent  paid  as  a  ﬁxed  share  of  output,  has 
been  investigated  in  detail  (see,  for  example,  Arimoto,  2005;  Agrawal,  1999;  Hayami  and 
Otsuka,  1993;  Eswaran  and  Kotwal,  1985).  Sharecropping  tenancy  can  be  understood  as  a 
mechanism  to  control  for  asymmetric  information  problems  (moral  hazard,  adverse  selection, 
and  strategic  default),  and  it  may  perform  better  than  a  ﬁxed­wage  or  a  ﬁxed­rent  contract 
under  the  conditions  prevailing  in  developing  countries  where  incomes  are  low,  production 
risks  high,  and  markets  for  credit  and  insurance  underdeveloped. 
Yet,  while  the  theoretical  literature  is  vast,  the  number  of  empirical  studies  on  the  eﬃ­
ciency  of  resource  allocation  and  the  determinants  of  contract  choice  is  small  (see  the  review 
by  Chiappori  and  Salanie,  2003).  The  number  of  empirical  studies  on  the  existence  of  diﬀer­
ent  compensation  policies  for  hired  workers  in  developing  countries  is  especially  small.1  The 
main  diﬃculty  in  examining  the  eﬃciency  issue  lies  in  the  identiﬁcation  of  selection  versus 
incentives.  In  other  words,  when  a  particular  contract  is  found  to  be  associated  with  low 
eﬃciency,  it  is  not  easy  to  judge  the  underlying  causality:  the  low  eﬃciency  could  be  due 
to  the  disincentive  eﬀects  of  the  contract  (workers  choose  a  low  eﬀort  due  to  the  contract 
design)  or  it  could  reﬂect  the  selection  mechanism  (only  less  able  workers  are  attracted  to 
the  contract). 
This  paper  therefore  develops  an  agency  model  of  contract  choice  in  the  hiring  of  agricul­
tural  labor  and  then  uses  the  model  to  estimate  the  determinants  of  the  choice,  considering 
the  case  of  Myanmar  (formerly  Burma).  As  a  salient  feature  relevant  for  the  agricultural  sec­
tor  in  a  low  income  country  such  as  Myanmar,  the  agency  model  incorporates  considerations 
of  food  security  as  well  as  incentive  eﬀects.  The  model  is  motivated  by  ﬁndings  and  data 
obtained  from  ﬁeld  surveys  in  rural  Myanmar  that  were  conducted  in  2001  and  cover  diverse 
1Among  the  few  existing  studies,  Foster  and  Rosenzweig  (1994)  demonstrated  that  in  rural  India,  the  level 
of  moral  hazard  diﬀered  depending  on  the  type  of  labor  contract,  i.e.  whether  it  consisted  of  on­farm  employ­
ment  (family  labor),  a  piece­rate  payment  scheme,  a  share­tenancy  contract,  or  a  time­wage  payment  scheme; 
Fukui  (1995)  investigated  the  eﬃciency  of  permanent  labor  contracts  in  the  Philippines  where  compensation 
consisted  of  piece­rate  wages  paid  in  kind.  Datta  et  al.  (2004)  investigated  the  mechanisms  responsible  for 
the  co­existence  of  both  cash  and  in­kind  wages  in  rural  India. 
1 agro­ecological  environments.  Unique  features  of  the  dataset  are,  ﬁrst,  that  various  kinds  of 
compensation  policies  are  observed,  and  second,  that  information  is  collected  on  wages  paid 
to  agricultural  workers  (employees)  and  wages  paid  by  farmers  (employers).  The  ﬁrst  feature 
enables  us  to  classify  wage  types  into  a  complete  range  of  categories  including  time  wages  in 
cash,  time  wages  in  kind,  piece­rate  wages  in  cash,  and  piece­rate  wages  in  kind.  Therefore, 
both  the  contrast  between  cash  and  in­kind  wages  as  well  as  the  contrast  between  time  and 
piece­rate  wages  can  be  analyzed.  The  second  feature  of  the  dataset  enables  us  to  examine 
the  dyadic  determinants  of  contract  choice. 
This  paper  is  the  ﬁrst  attempt  to  provide  a  model  of  worker  compensation  that  takes 
both  food  security  and  incentive  structures  into  account.  The  incorporation  of  food  security 
considerations  is  important  because in  a  low­income  country  like  Myanmar,  rural  dwellers’ 
food  security  is  greatly  aﬀected  by  ﬂuctuations  in  the  availability  and  prices  of  food  as  a  re­
sult  of  underdeveloped  produce  markets  and  the  susceptibility  of  agricultural  production  to 
weather  shocks.  As  shown  by  Kurosaki  and  Fafchamps  (2002),  Kurosaki  (1998),  Fafchamps 
(1992),  and  Finkelshtain  and  Chalfant  (1991),  food  security  considerations  are  likely  to  aﬀect 
farmers’  portfolio  choice  and  input  decisions  in  agricultural  production.  Unlike  ﬁrms,  which 
do  not  have  such  considerations,  risk­averse  farmers  may  increase  the  production  of  a  more 
risky  crop  if  the  crop  yields  food  that  is  important  in  their  consumption.  Adjustments  in 
production  choices  are  not  the  only  way  to  improve  food  security,  however.  Another  possi­
bility  to  achieve  food  security  is  through  adjustments  in  the  way  workers’  are  compensated. 
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  thus  to  provide  a  comprehensive  analysis  of  the  determinants  of 
contract  choice,  incorporating  both  food  security  issues  (such  as  risk  aversion,  the  variability 
of  income,  the  ability  to  cope  with  income  risk,  and  the  importance  of  the  basic  food  in 
budgets)  and  moral  hazard  issues  (such  as  the  ease  of  supervision  and  enforcement). 
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  provides  some  background  information 
on  Myanmar’s  economy  and  agricultural  policies  and  describes  the  dataset  used  in  this 
study.  The  section  also  estimates  a  production  function  and  the  results  produce  no  evidence 
suggesting  that  hired  labor  is  ineﬃcient.  This  result  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  there 
are  no  moral  hazard  problems;  instead,  it  may  indicate  that  institutional  arrangements  in 
labor  markets  in  the  study  region  are  eﬀective  in  preventing  moral  hazard  from  occurring.  In 
order  to  show  that  the  institutional  arrangements  can  serve  such  a  role,  Section  3  develops 
an  agency  model  of  wage  contract  choice.  Based  on  the  agency  model,  Section  4  analyzes 
the  determinants  of  wage  types  by  estimating  reduced­form  models.  Section  5  concludes. 
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2  Background  and  Data 
2.1  Myanmar’s  Economy  and  Agricultural  Policies 
Myanmar,  which  has  a  population  close  to  50  million,  is  in  transition  from  a  planned  to  a 
market  economy  (Thein,  2004).  The  military  government  that  has  been  in  power  since  1988 
has  deregulated  various  economic  activities.  Industrial  development  is  in  progress,  but  the 
agricultural  sector  still  remains  dominant  in  the  national  economy.  The  estimated  income 
level  is  among  the  lowest  in  the  world.  Rice  is  the  staple  food  in  Myanmar,  accounting  for 
more  than  20%  of  national  consumption  expenditure  (CSO,  2002). 
The  government  has  given  high  priority  to  the  expansion  of  paddy  production,  since  it 
believes  that  a  stable  supply  of  rice  is  a  prerequisite  for  political  stability.  To  achieve  this 
expansion,  the  government  has  introduced  various  reforms  in  agricultural  marketing  since 
the  late  1980s.  Under  the  marketing  regime  that  was  in  force  until  ﬁscal  year  2003/04, 
the  state  procured  from  farmers  a  limited  and  ﬁxed  amount  of  paddy  and  allowed  them 
to  sell  the  surplus  freely  in  private  markets.  Since  paddy  prices  in  the  market  during  the 
late  1980s  and  early  1990s  were  usually  much  higher  than  the  government­ﬁxed  procurement 
price,  the  reform  initially  gave  a  substantial  incentive  to  produce  a  surplus.  In  addition, 
the  government  has  been  promoting  the  expansion  of  paddy  areas  through  investment  in 
irrigation.  Throughout  the  1990s,  numerous  dams  were  constructed  in  some  areas,  while 
private  investment  in  small  scale  diesel  pumps  was  promoted  in  others,  in  order  to  increase 
paddy  cultivation  in  the  dry  season. 
As  a  result  of  these  two  measures,  both  the  area  under  cultivation  and  paddy  production 
in  Myanmar  rose  remarkably  in  the  early  1990s.  However,  such  policies  led  to  low  incomes 
for  farmers  in  the  late  1990s  and  the  early  2000s  because  the  production  of  paddy  became 
non­proﬁtable  due  to  repressed  domestic  prices  for  paddy  resulting  from  the  government 
monopoly  of  rice  export  (Kurosaki,  2005).  Furthermore,  rural  dwellers,  especially  in  rice­
deﬁcit  regions,  continued  to  suﬀer  from  unstable  supplies  because  of  inconsistencies  and 
frequent  changes  in  agricultural  policies.  Thus,  in  spite  of  increased  rice  production  at  the 
national  level,  low  income  farmers  or  farmers  in  rice­deﬁcit  regions  still  have  reason  to  be 
concerned  about  food  security. 
Another  important  characteristic  of  Myanmar’s  rural  economy  is  the  existence  of  a  large 
pool  of  landless  non­farm  households.  At  the  time  of  the  land  reforms  in  the  1950s,  land 
tillage  rights  were  distributed  to  village  residents  who  owned  means  of  production  such  as 
bullocks.  There  has  been  little  change  in  the  unequal  distribution  of  tillage  rights  since  then. 
The  share  of  landless  non­farm  households  in  villages  typically  ranges  from  20  to  50%.  The 
majority  of  landless  households  depend  on  agricultural  wages  for  their  income,  and  their 
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income  and  wealth  are  substantially  lower  than  those  of  landed  households.  Because  of  their 
poverty  and  dependence  on  farmers,  the  landless  may  from  time  to  time  be  unable  to  secure 
suﬃcient  food  for  subsistence.  Therefore,  food  security  is  a  real  and  urgent  concern  for 
landless  workers  in  rural  Myanmar. 
2.2  Characteristics  of  Sample  Villages  and  Households 
Micro  data  on  Myanmar’s  rural  economy  are  scarce. We  therefore  conducted  a  survey  of  sam­
ple  households  in  eight  selected  villages  in  June­October  2001  (Map  1).  The  characteristics 
of  the  villages  are  shown  in  Table  1.2 
The  ﬁrst  two  villages  (DELTA1  and  DELTA  2)  are  located  in  the  delta  regions  of  lower 
Myanmar,  which  produces  surplus  rice  for  export,  and  DRY1  is  located  in  the  Mandalay 
Basin,  which  is  one  of  Myanmar’s  centers  of  commercial  crop  production  due  to  its  long 
history  of  canal  irrigation  dating  back  to  Burma’s  dynastic  period.  In  contrast,  DRY2  and 
DRY3  represent  villages  relying  on  rainfed  agriculture.  DRY2  is  more  typical  of  a  dry  zone 
village  since  only  rainfed  crops  and  no  paddy  crops  are  grown  here.  HILL1  and  HILL2 
represent  villages  whose  economy  relies  on  growing  vegetables  for  market.  Both  villages  sell 
their  vegetables  to  major  consumption  centers  such  as  Yangon  and  Mandalay,  while  their 
paddy  cultivation  is  oriented  toward  subsistence.  The  last  village  of  the  study,  COAST, 
lies  in  the  coastal  region  of  southern  Myanmar,  where  tropical  agro­forestry  (rubber,  fruits, 
cashew  nuts,  etc.)  prevails.  Peasant  farmers  run  both  small­scale  rubber  estates  and  paddy 
farms.  Among  the  eight  villages  studied,  COAST  has  the  most  active  non­farm  sector,  which 
includes  general  shops,  cycle  taxis,  and  ﬁsh  processing.  The  eight  villages  chosen  are  thus 
quite  representative  of  the  diverse  agro­ecosystems  found  in  Myanmar. 
The  speciﬁc  villages  were  carefully  chosen  to  ensure  that  they  are  representative  of  each 
region.  As  far  as  can  be  judged  by  the  statistics  on  cropping  patterns  and  land  distribution, 
this  aim  was  achieved.  The  sample  households  were  drawn  from  a  complete  list  of  households 
in  each  of  the  villages  studied.  While  the  selected  households  are  not  strictly  a  random  sam­
ple,  we  used  information  obtained  from  village  leaders  and  local  administrations  to  eliminate 
discretionary  elements,  so  that  the  sample  households  were  as  representative  as  possible  in 
terms  of  the  distribution  of  farmland  and  primary  jobs.  A  total  of  521  households  were 
surveyed  in  the  eight  villages  and  their  distribution  is  shown  in  Table  2.  The  341  households 
denoted  in  the  table  as  “Farm”  households  had  land  tillage  rights,  while  the  180  denoted  as 
“Non­farm”  households  had  no  tillage  rights. 
A  structured  questionnaire  was  used  for  all  households  to  establish  household  character­
2The  smallest  administrative  unit  in  Myanmar  is  the  “village  tract,”  which  usually  consists  of  several 
hamlets  or  natural  villages.  While  Table  1  refers  to  “village  tracts,”  in  the  text  and  the  following  tables,  they 
are  simply  referred  to  as  “villages”  for  brevity. 
4 istics,  household  assets,  income,  consumption,  and  debt  and  credit.  The  sample  households 
include  2,850  persons,  implying  that  the  average  household  size  was  5.5  persons.  If  house­
holds  operated  farmland,  they  were  asked  additional  questions  on  farm  management.  This 
part  of  the  dataset  provides  the  information  on  agricultural  wages  paid  by  the  farmer  to 
laborers.  Household  heads  or  other  relevant  persons  were  interviewed  by  local  research  assis­
tants  and  the  information  was  cross­checked  on  the  spot  to  ensure  internal  consistency  and 
data  quality. 
Table  3  reports  the  asset  and  income  status  of  the  sample  households.  The  average  size  of 
farm  households’  land  holding  was  8.6  acres,  which  is  large  by  South­East  Asian  standards. 
Ownership  of  modern  assets  was  not  widespread:  none  of  the  households  owned  a  four­wheel 
tractor;  bicycles  were  common  among  villagers  but  motorcycles  and  four­wheel  vehicles  for 
transportation  were  very  rare;  TVs  or  VCRs  were  also  very  rare.  Livestock  represented  the 
main  form  of  assets.  Comparing  diﬀerent  household  types,  non­farm  households  had  fewer 
total  assets  than  farm  households. 
Overall,  average  incomes  were  184,000  Kyats  per  household  and  36,000  Kyats  per  person 
per  year.  If  these  ﬁgures  are  converted  at  the  market  exchange  rate  of  650  Kyats/US$ 
prevailing  during  the  study  period,  they  are  equivalent  to  $283  per  household  and  $55  per 
person  per  year.  Incomes  in  the  sample  villages  thus  were  indeed  low,  but  not  that  diﬀerent 
from  the  average  village  in  rural  Myanmar.  If  these  incomes  are  converted  using  the  price 
of  rice  in  the  Yangon  market  (56  Kyats/kg)  prevailing  during  the  study  period,  they  are 
equivalent  to  3,300  kg  of  rice  per  household  and  640  kg  per  person  per  year.  The  average 
income  level  was  also  lower  among  the  non­farm  households  than  among  the  farm  households, 
although  the  income  disparity  was  not  as  large  as  the  asset  disparity. 
2.3  Labor  Contracts  and  Farm  Productivity 
In  rural  Myanmar,  two  kinds  of  agricultural  laborers  can  be  found  and  they  play  diﬀerent 
roles  (Takahashi,  2000).  Casual  laborers  are  hired  for  a  day  or  several  days  to  conduct  a  well­
speciﬁed  farm  operation.  In  contrast,  seasonally­hired  laborers  are  employed  for  a  cropping 
season  and  like  family  workers  are  responsible  for  various  farm  operations.  Following  the 
literature  on  rural  institutions,  they  will  be  labeled  permanent  laborers  below.  Thus,  total 
farm  labor  can  be  decomposed  into  three  categories:  labor  by  unpaid  family  members  of 
farm  households,  casual  labor,  and  permanent  labor. 
The  average  share  of  income  from  casual  farm  labor  in  the  earned  income  of  all  sample 
households  is  12.7%,  while  the  share  of  income  from  permanent  farm  labor  is  2.6%  (Table 
3).  Farm  households  which  usually  employ  casual  and  permanent  laborers  sometimes  also 
send  family  members  to  farm  wage  work.  The  share  of  casual  farm  labor  in  the  income 
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of  farm  households  is  5.0%  and  that  of  permanent  labor  is  0.1%.  In  contrast,  the  income 
share  of  farm  wages  is  higher  among  non­farm  households:  34.4%  (casual  labor)  and  9.5% 
(permanent  labor). 
In  studies  on  rural  development  in  Asia,  it  is  often  argued  that  in  South  Asia,  hired 
labor  is  less  eﬃcient  than  family  labor  so  that  the  productivity  of  large  farms  is  lower  than 
that  of  small  farms.  On  the  other  hand,  such  ineﬃciency  is  rarely  found  in  South­East  Asia 
(Hayami  and  Otsuka,  1993;  Fukui,  1995).  Especially  in  South­East  Asia,  even  small  farms 
with  surplus  family  labor  employ casual  labor  for  harvesting.  This  phenomenon  is  interpreted 
as  income  sharing,  i.e.,  farmers  redistribute  their  income  to  poor  laborers  through  employing 
more  harvesting  workers  (Hayami  and  Kikuchi,  1999).  The  absence  of  ineﬃciency  regarding 
hired  labor  in  South­East  Asia  could  be  attributable  to  this  norm  of  income  sharing.  In 
Myanmar,  some  of  the  rural  institutions  are  similar  to  those  in  South  Asia,  while  others  are 
more  similar  to  those  in  South­East  Asia  (Takahashi,  2000).  Evidence  on  the  eﬃciency  of 
hired  labor  in  rural  Myanmar  is,  however,  lacking. 
To  investigate  whether  our  dataset  contains  evidence  that  hired  labor  is  ineﬃcient,  pro­
duction  functions  are  estimated.  As  one  of  the  production  factors,  total  labor  (the  sum 
of  family,  casual,  and  permanent  labor  in  man­days)  is  included.  As  productivity  shifters, 
the  share  of  casual  labor  in  total  labor  and  the  share  of  permanent  labor  in  total  labor  are 
added.  If  the  three  types  of  labor  are  perfect  substitutes  and  there  is  no  productivity  dif­
ference  among  them,  the  share  of  casual  (permanent)  labor  should  have  a  zero  coeﬃcient. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  the  coeﬃcient  turns  out  to  be  signiﬁcantly  negative,  this  would  be 
an  indication  of  ineﬃciency.  From  the  ﬁeld  survey  results,  518  observations  of  farm­level 
production  were  obtained  for  various  crops.  Since  the  farming  techniques  for  paddy  crops 
are  fundamentally  diﬀerent  from  those  for  non­paddy  crops,  separate  production  functions 
are  estimated  for  paddy  and  non­paddy  crops.  Village  and  crop  ﬁxed  eﬀects  are  introduced 
into  the  regression  to  control  for  diﬀerences  in  market  and  production  environments. 
The  ordinary  least  squares  (OLS)  estimation  results  based  on  a  Cobb­Douglas  speciﬁ­
cation  are  reported  in  Table  4.  The  elasticity  parameters  for  production  factors  are  in  a 
reasonable  range.  Since  the  dependent  variable  is  output  per  acre,  we  can  obtain  the  land 
elasticity  of  crop  production  by  adding  one  to  the  reported  coeﬃcient  on  the  land  variable. 
Various  measures  of  farmers’  human  capital  were  tried  as  productivity  shifters  and  it  was 
found  that  the  level  of  education  of  the  household  head  had  a  signiﬁcantly  positive  eﬀect. 
In  none  of  the  four  models,  the  coeﬃcient  on  the  permanent  labor  share  or  the  casual 
labor  share  is  negative  with  statistical  signiﬁcance.  The  coeﬃcient  on  the  permanent  labor 
share  is  positive  with  statistical  signiﬁcance  (at  the  1  to  5%  level)  in  the  regressions  for 
paddy  value­added,  non­paddy  output,  and  non­paddy  value­added.  The  coeﬃcient  on  the 
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casual  labor  share  is  positive  with  statistical  signiﬁcance  in  one  out  of  the  four  regressions. 
Therefore,  at  ﬁrst  glance,  hired  labor  in  rural  Myanmar  does  not  seem  to  be  ineﬃcient.  But 
does  this  imply  that  farmers  face  no  moral  hazard  problems  in  hiring  labor? 
Needless  to  say,  the  OLS  estimates  in  Table  4  suﬀer  from  endogeneity  bias:  contractual 
choice  and  factor  input  levels  are  determined  endogenously  and  the  possibility  of  omitted 
variables  and  misspeciﬁcation  cannot  be  ruled  out.  It  is  possible  that  the  signiﬁcantly  positive 
coeﬃcients  on  hired  labor  shares  imply  that  more  productive  farmers  are  better  able  to  hire 
outside  labor  and  their  ability  is  not  observed.  One  potential  way  to  solve  the  endogeneity 
problem  would  be  to  show  the  absence  of  any  endogeneity  bias  in  a  statistical  sense  using 
the  exogeneity  test;  another  would  be  to  estimate  the  model  using  instrumental  variables 
(Chiappori  and  Salanie,  2003).  Both  procedures  require  valid  instruments,  which  are  hard 
to  ﬁnd  in  the  current  dataset. 
Instead  of  trying  instrumental  variables  estimations,  this  paper  concentrates  on  the  ﬁrst 
stage  decision  making  process  (i.e.,  the  determinants  of  labor  contracts).  If  it  can  be  shown 
that  contractual  choice  is  consistent  with  self­selection,  the  results  of  the  OLS  estimation 
suggesting  that  hired  labor  has  no  negative  eﬀect  on  productivity  do  not  contradict  the 
existence  of  moral  hazard.  The  absence  of  a  negative  eﬀect  may  instead  imply  that  any 
opportunistic  behavior  by  hired  workers  is  successfully  suppressed  by  the  way  contracts  are 
designed. 
To  investigate  the  way  contracts  are  designed,  the  following  observations  on  hired  labor 
in  agriculture  are  compiled  from  the  primary  data:  60  cases  of  wage  transactions  for  those 
employed  as  permanent  laborers,  approximately  1,700  cases  for  those  employed  as  casual 
laborers,  164  cases  for  farmers  employing  permanent  laborers,  and  approximately  1,400  cases 
for  farmers  employing  casual  laborers.  These  observations  include  detailed  information  on 
farm  work  and  the  mode,  conditions,  and  timing  of  wage  payments. 
Casual  labor  transactions  display a  considerable variation  in  terms  of  the  mode  of  wage 
payments.  There  are  four  broad  categories,  each  of  which  includes  several  sub­categories 
(Table  5).3  First,  wages  ﬁxed  in  money  terms  and  paid  per  labor  hour  (“Kyats/day”) 
were  found  most  frequently,  accounting  for  79%  of  the  3,100  observations  of  hired  labor 
In  addition  to  those  shown  in  the  table,  there  are  other  dimensions  in  which  the  wages  paid  to  casual 
laborers varied  (Kurosaki,  2004). For  instance,  the  number  of  meals  per  day  served  to  hired  laborers  ranged 
from  zero  to  three.  Approximately  two  thirds  of  casual  labor  transactions  were  without  meals,  while  a  little 
less  than  one  third  were  with  one  meal.  The  remaining  transactions  involved  two  or  three  meals  per  day.  The 
quality  of  meals  also  diﬀered.  When  the  payment  was  in  cash,  such  as  Kyats/day  (time  wage)  or  Kyats/acre 
(piece  rate),  some  workers  were  paid  a  month  or  two  in  advance.  In  such  cases,  the  wage  rate  was  often 
reduced  by  20  to  33%.  Such  a  large  discount  suggests  the  severity  of  credit  constraints  faced  by  poor  laborers 
(interest  rates  in  the  study  regions  were  in  the  following  range:  around  10%  per  month  in  the  informal  credit 
market  without  collateral,  3  to  5%  per  month  charged  by  private  pawn  shops,  and  1.25%  per  month  charged 
on  agricultural  production  loans  provided  by  the  public  sector). 
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3(1,700+1,400).  The  modern  mode  of  payment  ﬁxed  as  “Kyats/day”  is  thus  the  dominant 
one  in  Myanmar. 
The  payment  of  wages  ﬁxed  in  cash  per  day  may  put  a  heavy  burden  on  laborers’  welfare 
in  terms  of  food  security.  When  grain  markets  are  not  working  eﬃciently,  laborers  are 
exposed  to  the  risk  of  high  prices  or  the  non­availability  of  food  in  the  market.  If  this  is  the 
case,  cash  wages  are  subject  to  the  erosion  of  purchasing  power.  In  contrast,  wages  paid  in 
kind,  such  as  grains,  are  not  subject  to  such  risk.  We  therefore  expect  that  wages  are  more 
likely  to  be  paid  in  kind  when  food  security  concerns  are  important.  In  the  current  case, 
time  wages  in  kind  accounted  for  2.5%  out  of  the  3,100  cases.  This  is  the  second  category  of 
the  mode  of  wage  payments. 
Another  situation  in  which  wages  may  not  be  paid  in  Kyats/day  is  when  time  wages 
provide  workers  with  an  incentive  to  shirk  because  their  work  eﬀort  may  not  be  observable 
to  the  employer  and  the  wage  is  insensitive  to  workers’  eﬀort.  The  third  category,  piece­
rate  contracts,  should  be  superior  if  shirking  is  potentially  a  problem  and  the  farm  operation 
requires  quick  completion.  Table  5  shows  that  such transactions  accounted  for  15%  out  of  the 
3,100  cases.  Within  the  broad  category  of  piece­rate  wages  in  cash,  there  are  several  varieties. 
For  example,  contracts  with  the  payment  ﬁxed  in  Kyats  per  acre  of  farming  operation  are 
observed  in  every  stage  of  farming  from  land  preparation  to  harvesting.  Contracts  with  the 
payment  ﬁxed  in  Kyats  per  unit  of  farm  work,  such  as  the  amount  of  seedlings/weeds  taken, 
are  also  observed  in  various  farming  operations. 
The  fourth  category  combines  the  piece­rate  system  with  in­kind  payment,  such  as  a  ﬁxed 
proportion  of  harvested  output  paid  to  laborers  (sharecropping).  These  cases  accounted  for 
1.8%  out  of  the  3,100  cases. 
To  correct  for  diﬀerences  in  the  importance  of  each  category  of  compensation  policy  in 
the  rural  economy,  the  share  of  each  mode  in  the  total  was  re­calculated  using  two  sets  of 
weights:  total  man­days  and  total  Kyats.4  Interestingly,  the  share  of  time  wages  in  cash  is 
larger  when  man­days  are  used  as  weights  than  when  the  money  metric  is  used  as  a  weight, 
while  the  share  of  the  other  three  groups  of  wage  modes  is  smaller  when  the  weight  is  man­
days  than  when  the  weight  is  Kyats.  This  implies  that  workers  earn  more  per  day  on  average 
when  wages  are  paid  in  kind  or  in  piece  rates. 
In  all  villages,  at  least  two  of  the  four  wage  modes  were  observed.  Time  wages  in  cash 
and  piece  rates  in  cash  were  found  in  all  eight  villages.  In­kind  wages  were  observed  in  all 
villages  with  the  exception  of  DELTA1.  When  a  certain  farm  operation was  conducted  by 
In  the  following  cases,  both  weights  have  to  be  estimated  using  ﬁxed  coeﬃcients  for  each  village  based  on 
our  ﬁeld  observations:  ﬁrst,  when  piece  rates  are  adopted,  since  farmers  usually  do  not  remember  the  exact 
number  of  days  laborers  actually  worked;  second,  when  the  wage  is  paid  in  kind,  as  the  employer  and  the 
employee  only  remember  the  quantity,  which  has  to  be  converted  into  Kyats  using  village  prices. 
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4a  group  of  casual  laborers  hired  by  a  farmer,  the  group  was  paid  in  the  same  way.  In  other 
words,  we  observed  no  instance  where  several  casual  laborers  were  hired  to  work  on  the  same 
plot  and  did  the  same  work  together  but  were  paid  diﬀerently.  However,  we  often  observed 
instances  in  which  casual  laborers  working  separately  on  diﬀerent  plots  were  paid  in  diﬀerent 
ways,  although  they  were  doing  the  same  farm  work  on  the  same  crop  in  the  same  village. 
3  Theoretical  Model 
3.1  Setting 
This  section  develops  an  agency  model  to  guide  the  econometric  investigation  of  wage  con­
tract  choice  in  rural  Myanmar.  The  model  incorporates  three  elements  that  are  important  in 
wage  contract  choice:  the  potential  beneﬁt  and  cost  of  monitoring  workers  to  prevent  shirk­
ing,  laborers’  consideration  of  food  security,  and  the  process  in  which  the  optimal  contract 
is  chosen.  To  simplify  the  analysis,  any  potential  trade­oﬀ  between  the  output  quantity  per 
labor  hour  and  the  quality  of  output  in  the  case  of  piece­rate  contracts  is  assumed  away. 5 
Since  the  number  of  labor  hours  is  easily  monitored,  it  is  ﬁxed  in  the  following  analysis.  To 
reﬂect  the  conditions  of  low  income  developing  countries,  the  commodity  “food,”  which  is 
the  main  output  in  production  and  the  main  item  in  consumption,  is  introduced  into  the 
model.  To  simplify  the  model,  there  are  only  two  consumption  items:  food  and  “non­food.” 
The  price  of  “non­food”  is  normalized  at  one. 
A  farmer  (principal)  is  searching  for  a  laborer  (agent)  to  produce  food.  The  physical 
output  (measured  in  kg)  produced  by  a  laborer  is  assumed  to  be  a  product  of  f(e)  and  θ, 
where  f(e) is  a  production  function  with  f�(.) ≥ 0  and  f��(.) ≤ 0  (e  is  the  agent’s  eﬀort),  and 
θ  is  a  yield  shock  with  a  mean  of  one.  Due  to  underdeveloped  agricultural  produce  markets 
and  possibly  due  to  unpredictable  interventions  by  the  state  in  rural  marketing,  the  price  of 
food,  p,  ﬂuctuates;  its  mean  is  ¯ p.  It  follows  that  the  output  value  from  production  is  pθf(e), 
measured  in  “Kyats”  (Myanmar’s  currency).  To  reﬂect  the  variation  in  wage  contracts 
observed  in  the  study  region,  it  is  assumed  that  there  are  four  types  of  wage  contracts:  [1] 
time  wages  in  cash,  [2]  time  wages  in  kind  (paid  in  food),  [3]  piece  rates  in  cash,  and  [4] 
piece  rates  in  kind  (paid  in  food).  Let  the  wage  rate  in  each  contract  be  expressed  as  wj 
(j  = 1, .., 4).  It  should  be  noted  that  the  units  of  the  wage  rates  are  diﬀerent:  w1  is  measured 
in  Kyats/day,  w2  in  kg/day,  and  w3  in  Kyats/kg.  The  wage  rate  w4  is  the  share  of  the  output 
retained  by  the  worker.  Ex  post,  Wj,  the  gross  value  of  the  farmer’s  payment  to  the  laborer 
5See  Paarsch  and  Shearer  (2000)  for  a  model  of  the  trade­oﬀ  and  its  empirical  importance  in  the  case  of 
the  tree­planting  industry  in  Canada. 
9 under  contract  j,  is  equivalent  to 
W1  =  w1, W2  =  w2p,  W3  =  w3θf(e), W4  =  w4pθf(e),  (1) 
The  agent  is  a  poor  landless  laborer.  Making  an  eﬀort  brings  him  a  direct  disutility. 
Because  of  the  limited  opportunity to  cope  with  risk  ex  post  (Kurosaki  and  Fafchamps,  2002), 
he  behaves  in  a  risk­averse  manner.  Thus,  his  ex  ante  payoﬀ  is  given  by  E[v(y,p)]  − g(e), 
where  E[.] is  an  expectation  operator,  v(y,p) is  an  indirect  utility function  from  consumption, 
and  g(e)  is  a  disutility  function  from  eﬀort  with  g�(.) ≥ 0  and  g(0)  =  0.  For  simplicity,  it  is 
assumed  that  the  laborer  has  no  other  income  sources  so  that  his  consumption  expenditure 
y  is  equal  to  Wj.  This  setting  implies  that  piece­rate  wages  ([3]  or  [4])  have  the  advantage 
of  providing  the  worker  with  a  greater  incentive  to  make  an  eﬀort  at  the  expense  of  the  loss 
in  utility  captured  by  g(e).  The  following  properties  are  assumed  for  the  partial  derivatives 
of  the  indirect  utility  function: 
vy  >  0, vp  <  0, vyy  <  0, vpp  <  0, vyp  >  0, vyyy  >  0.  (2) 
The  ﬁrst  two  properties  are  required  for  a  valid  indirect  utility function.  The  third  guarantees 
that  the  laborer  is  risk­averse  in  the  Arrow­Pratt  sense,  and  the  fourth  implies  that,  for  a 
given  income  level,  the  laborer’s  welfare  decreases  when  the  food  price  variability  increases. 
The  fourth  property  is  especially  appropriate  for  a  poor  worker  in  a  developing  country  who 
is  vulnerable  to  food  insecurity. 6  The  condition  vyp  >  0  implies  that  the  laborer’s  welfare 
increases  when  the  correlation  between  the  food  price  and  income  becomes  more positive, 
with  the  income  mean,  the  price  mean,  the  income  variance,  and  the  food price  variance  being 
held  constant.  Since  a  positive  correlation  of  the  food  price  and  the  income  level  means  that 
real  income  is  more  stable,  this  assumption  is  also  justiﬁable  for  a  poor  laborer  in  a  developing 
country.  The  last  assumption,  vyyy  >  0,  corresponds  to  “risk  prudence”  (Kimball,  1990). 
Since  prudent  risk  preferences  guarantee  that  the  welfare  cost  of  consumption  ﬂuctuations 
decreases  with  the  level  of  expected  consumption,  the  assumption  is  appropriate  for  the 
analysis  of  this  paper. 
A The  reservation  utility  of  the  agent  is  exogenously  given  at  u0  ,  which  corresponds  to  a 
unit  of  labor  without  eﬀort  for  which  the  hourly  wage  w0  (Kyats/day)  is  paid.  Then,  the 
However,  vpp  <  0  is  not  always  satisﬁed  in  popular  utility  functions  used  in  the  literature.  For  instance, 
when  the  utility  function  is  Cobb­Douglas  with  constant  relative  risk  aversion,  i.e.,  v(y,p)  = (y/p
β)
1−ψ/(1  −
ψ),  ψ  >  0,  the  risk  aversion  should  be  suﬃciently  high  (ψ  >  1 +  1/β),  for  vpp  <  0.  Datta  et  al.  (2004)  in 
their  analysis  of  contract  choice  between  cash  and  kind  wages  in  low  income  economies  adopted  a  constant 
elasticity  of  substitution  (CES)  utility  function,  which  nests  Cobb­Douglas  as  a  special  case.  Because  they 
assumed  a  relatively  low  value  for  ψ,  their  analysis  turned  out  to  be  a  case  with  vpp  >  0.  In  other  words,  they 
implicitly  assumed  that  the  worker’s  welfare  increases  when  the  food  price  becomes  more  variable.  Since  this 
is  not  appropriate  for  modeling  poor  workers’  behavior,  this  paper  adopts  a  utility  function  that  is  associated 
with  vpp  <  0. 
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agent’s  participation  constraint  for  contract  j  is  given  by

A A  uj  =  E[v(Wj,p)]  − g(e) ≥ u0  .  (3) 
The  principal  is  a  rich  farmer  who  does  not  need  to  worry  about  price  and  yield  risks. 
Thus,  his  objective  function  uP  is  given  by 
P  uj  =  E[pθf(e) − Wj].  (4) 
Because  of  the  existence  of  yield  risk  θ,  the  eﬀort  level  e  by  the  laborer  is  unobservable  to 
and  unenforceable  by  the  principal.  Therefore,  to  maximize  uP,  the  principal  has  to  meet 




= 0.  (5)
∂ej 
≤ 0, ej  ≥ 0, ej  ∂ej 
Solving  this  equation  implicitly,  the  incentive  constraint  can  be  expressed  as  a  reduced  form 
A 
0  ,ζ)  where  ζ  is  a  vector  of  parameters  that  characterize  the  preference  of  the  ( ∗ w ,u j j
∗ ≡ e j e
agent,  farming  technology,  and  the  nature  of  price  and  yield  risks. 
3.2  Optimal  Contract 
Under  contract  [1]  and  contract  [2],  ∂Wj/∂ej  = 0  so  that  ∂uA
j  /∂ej  <  0,  implying  that  the 
agent  makes  a  minimal  eﬀort  (e∗ 
j  =  0,j  = 1,2).  The  principal  therefore  chooses  w
 ∗ 
1  and  w
 ∗ 
2 
at  the  level  where  the  participation  constraint  is  satisﬁed  as  an  equality  with  the  condition

that  e∗ 
j  =  0,j = 1,2.  Thus,  w
 equals  the  worker’s  opportunity wage,  i.e.,  ∗ 
1  w
 ∗ 
1  =  w0.  Between 
contract  [1]  and  contract  [2],  the  principal  prefers  the  one  with  the  lower  E[Wj].  Then,  what 
kind  of  parameters  determine  the  relative  attractiveness  of  the  two  contracts? 
By  applying  the  second­order  Taylor  approximation  of  v(y,p) to  the  relation  E[v(w
 )] ∗,p 1 = 
E[v(pw )],  we  obtain  ∗,p 2
1
[v(w ¯ ∗ , 1 )] ( ∗ ≈ ,p v w 1 p) +  v ¯ppV ar(p),  (6) E
2 
1  2 ) +  2¯ ∗ 
2 V ar(p)  v ¯yy(w vypw [v(w
 ∗ 
2 )] ( ∗ ≈ p, p v w 2 ¯ p) +  p,  ¯ ∗ + 2  v ¯pp  .  (7) E
2
2 ) ∗ + 2 Comparing  the  two,  the  sign  of  E[W1]− E[W2](=  w p ¯) is  the  same  as  that  of  ¯ vyy(w ∗ 
2 
∗− w 1 
2¯ vypw This  implies  that  when  the  laborer  is  highly  concerned  about  food  security  in  the
 ∗. 2
sense  that  vyp  is  suﬃciently  positive,  E[W1] − E[W2]  >  0,  so  that  the  principal  prefers 
contract  [2]  to  contract  [1].  This  is  intuitively  plausible. 
Following  Fafchamps  (1992)  and  Kurosaki  and  Fafchamps  (2002),  the  size  of  vyp  can  be 
investigated  further  using  Roy’s  identity,  resulting  in 
vyp  =  −qyvy  − qvyy  = 
vy 
p 
s(ψ  − η),  (8) 
11 (all  evaluated  at  the  means  of  y  and  p),  where  q  is  the  Marshallian  demand  for  food,  qy  is  its 
derivative  with  respect  to  income,  s  is  the  budget  share  of  food,  ψ  is  the  Arrow­Pratt  measure 
of  relative  risk  aversion,  and  η  is  the  income  elasticity  of  food  demand.  The  assumption  of 
vyp  >  0  is  thus  equivalent  to  the  assumption  of  ψ >  η  in  this  approximation,  which  is  likely 
to  be  satisﬁed  for  low  income  households  (Fafchamps,  1992).  As  ψ  increases,  not  only  does 
vyp  increase,  but  vyy  also  decreases,  so  that  the  direction  of  the  change  of  E[W1] − E[W2] is 
ambiguous.  In  contrast,  as  s  increases,  expression  (8)  increases,  meaning  that  contract  [2] 
becomes  more  attractive  to  the  employer  than  contract  [1].  Since  s  can  be  measured  using 
household  expenditure  data,  we  can  derive  the  following  proposition,  which  is  empirically 
veriﬁable: 
Proposition  1.  An  increase  in  the  share  of  food  in  the  laborer’s  family  budget  will  increase 
the  probability  for  the  employer  to  oﬀer  a  contract  with  time  wages  in  kind  against  a  contract 
with  time  wages  in  cash. 
Under  contract  [3]  or  contract  [4],  ∂Wj/∂ej  has  the  same  sign  as  f�(e).  Therefore,  when 
f�(e)  is  not  suﬃciently  large,  the  incentive  compatibility  constraint  of  (5)  is  characterized 
by  a  corner  solution  with  ej
∗  = 0,j  = 3,4.  Even  in  such  cases,  the  two  contracts  may 
bring  diﬀerent  welfare  results  for  the  laborer  due  to  the  existence  of  yield  risk  θ.  If  θ  and  p 
are  independent,  contract  [3]  is  likely  to  be  inferior  to  contract  [2],7  because  W3  and  p  are 
not  correlated  while  W2  and  p  are  positively  correlated.  Contract  [4]  is  the  least  preferred 
because  of  its  larger  variance  of  W4.  The  case  in  which  θ  and  p  are  independent  corresponds 
to  the  assumption  that  farmers  face  idiosyncratic  yield  risks  only  and  the  sources  of  price 
ﬂuctuations  are  from  the  demand  side  only.  If  θ  and  p  are  negatively  correlated,  which  is 
more  likely  in  a  closed  village  economy,  the  attractiveness  of  [4]  increases  because  the  variance 
of  W4  is  reduced.  Therefore,  when  output  is  less  responsive  to  eﬀort,  the  choice  among  the 
four  contracts  depends  on  the  parameters  characterizing  the  stochastic  distribution  of  prices 
and  yields  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  parameters  characterizing  preferences  toward  income 
risk  and  price  risk  on  the  other. 
When  f�(e) is  suﬃciently  large,  the  incentive  compatibility  constraint  under  contract  [3] 
is  associated  with  an  interior  solution.  With  an  interior  solution,  expression  (5)  should  be 
rewritten  as 
E[vyw3θf�(e)]  =  w3f�(e)E[vyθ] =  g�(e).  (9) 
Contract  [3]  is  inferior  to  contract  [2]  when  the  variability  of  θ  is  not  too  small  compared  to  that  of  p. 







Similarly,  under  contract  [4],  it  should  be  rewritten  as

E[vyw4pθf (e)]
=  w4f (e)E[vypθ] =  g (e).  (10) 
Let  e∗ 
3  and  e
 be  the  agent’s  solution  satisfying  each  of  these  equations.  ∗ 
4 
Taking  this  relation  into  consideration,  the  principal  chooses
w∗ 
3  and  w
 ∗ 
4  to  maximize  u
 P 
subject  to  the  participation  constraint.  The  participation  constraint  may  not  be  binding, 
depending  on  the  curvature  of  function  f(.).8  In  the  last  phase  of  the  decision  making  process, 
the  principal  chooses  the  optimal  contract  that  is  associated  with  the  highest  value  among 
E[pθ]f(0) − w1,  E[pθ]f(0) − ¯ pw2,  E[pθ]f(e ),  and  ∗ E 3 ) ( ∗ f − w e 3 3 [pθ]f(e
 ) ∗ E 4 ) ( ∗ f − w e 4 4 [pθ] and

oﬀers  it  to  the  agent.  Since  the  agent’s  participation  constraint  is  satisﬁed  by  construction, 
the  agent  accepts  the  oﬀer.  Similar  to  the  corner  solution  cases,  the  optimal  choice  among 
the  four  contracts  depends  on  the  parameters  characterizing  price  and  yield  risks  on  the 
one  hand,  and  parameters  characterizing  risk  aversion  on  the  other.  In  addition  to  these 
parameters,  the  parameters  characterizing  the  output  response  to  eﬀort  aﬀect  the  contract 
choice. 
To  investigate  the  eﬀects  of  the  production  technology  parameters,  we  now  consider  the 
case  when  the  principal  is  indiﬀerent  between  contracts  [1]  and  [3]  but  prefers  these  to  con­
tracts  [2]  and  [4].  Due  to  the  assumption  of  vyyy  >  0,  a  marginal  increase  in  f (e)  due  to

exogenous  factors  leads  the  agent  to  marginally  increase  his  eﬀort.  With  the  increased  eﬀort, 
the  income  of  the  laborer  marginally  increases.  Since  the  participation  constraint  is  binding 
when  contract  [1]  is  optimal,  the  increased  income  of  the  laborer  provides  an  opportunity 
for  the  principal  to  extract  a  greater  surplus  from  the  agent.  Therefore,  the  marginal  in­
crease  in  f
(e) leads  to  a  situation  where  contract  [3]  is  strictly  preferred  to  the  other  three. 
Following  similar  reasoning,  when  the  principal  is  indiﬀerent  between  contracts  [2]  and  [4]

but  prefers  these  to  contracts  [1]  and  [3],  the  marginal  increase  in  f (e)  leads  to  a  situation

where  contract  [4]  is  strictly  preferred  to  the  other  three.  Thus,  the  following  proposition  is 
obtained: 
Proposition  2.  An  increase  in  the  eﬀort  elasticity  of  output  will  increase  the  probability 
for  the  employer  to  oﬀer  a  contract  paid  in  piece  rates  against  a  contract  paid  in  time  wages. 
Output  is  especially  eﬀort  elastic  when  quickness  in  conducting  the  work  is  important. 
This  has  the  empirically  veriﬁable  implication  that  a  piece­rate  contract  is  more  likely  to 
be  adopted  than  a  contract  with  time  wages  when  the  farming  operation  requires  quick 
However,  as  far  as  numerical  examples  show  (see  next  subsection),  the  participation  constraint  is  always 
binding. 
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8completion.  When  the  eﬀort  is  observable  and  enforceable  by  the  employer,  such  a  premium 
for  piece­rate  contracts  disappears. 
3.3  Numerical  Examples 
To  gain  a  concrete  idea  of  what  the  optimal  choice  looks  like,  the  agency  model  above  is 
calibrated  numerically.  See  the  Appendix  for  details  of  the  speciﬁcation  and  calibration 
parameters  actually  adopted.  The  indirect  utility  function  in  the  agent’s  payoﬀ  function  is 
speciﬁed  with  a  risk­averse  linear  expenditure  system  (LES).  The  LES  has  the  appealing 
property  that  the  number  of  parameters  is  small  and  it  provides  a  plausible  prediction  of 
poor  households’  response  to  avoid  starvation.  With  the  LES  speciﬁcation,  the  situation 
of  starvation  is  described  as  income  (y)  being  so  low  that  it  is  close  to  the  total  value  of 
the  subsistence  needs  in  consumption  (Atkeson  and  Ogaki,  1996;  Kurosaki  and  Fafchamps, 
2002).  LES  utility  functions  require  smaller  values  of  risk  aversion  to  assure  that  vpp  <  0 
than  Cobb­Douglas  or  CES  utility  functions.  The  welfare  cost  of  eﬀort  to  the  worker,  g(e), 
is  speciﬁed  as  a  linear  function.  The  principal’s  production  function  is  speciﬁed  as  iso­elastic 
with  respect  to  1+e  (the  total  eﬀort),  where  1  is  the  minimum  eﬀort  and  e  is  the  additional 
eﬀort.  Regarding  the  stochastic  process,  a  discrete  distribution  of  price  and  yield  risks  is 
assumed  so  that  the  expected  utility  can  be  evaluated  by  taking  the  probability­weighted 
sum  of  the  utility  under  each  pair  of  realized  values  of  p  and  θ. 
Figure  1  plots  the  results  when  φ  (the  relative  risk  aversion  parameter  with  respect  to 
income  after  meeting  subsistence  needs)  is  set  at  3  and  the  standard  deviation  of  yield  risk  θ 
is  set  at  40%  of  that  of  p.  It  is  assumed  that  θ  is  distributed  independently  of  p  (no  common 
yield  shocks).  The  horizontal  line  extending  from  the  vertical  axis  shows  the  indiﬀerence 
curve  between  contracts  [1]  and  [2].  When  the  food  share  s  is  higher  than  this  line,  contract 
[2]  (time  wage  in  kind)  is  chosen  as  a  better  arrangement  to  improve  the  food  security  of  the 
laborer  than  contract  [1]  (time  wage  in  cash).  The  horizontal  line  moves  downward  when 
higher  risk  aversion  (a  higher  value  of  φ) is  assumed  in  this  case.  When  we  move  to  the  right 
in  the  ﬁgure  (i.e.,  we  increase  the  eﬀort  elasticity  of  output,  ρ),  starting  from  a  point  where 
s  is  smaller  than  the  horizontal  line,  we  ﬁnd  contract  [1]  as  the  optimal  contract  initially, 
but  then  we  reach  the  indiﬀerence  curve  between  contracts  [1]  and  [3].  After  we  cross  the 
indiﬀerence  curve,  we  ﬁnd  contract  [3]  (piece  rate  in  cash)  as  the  optimal  contract.  When 
we  start  from  a  point  where  s  is  slightly  larger  than  the  horizontal  line,  we  ﬁnd  contract  [2] 
as  the  initial  optimal  contract,  but  then  we  reach  the  indiﬀerence  curve  between  contracts 
[2]  and  [3],  beyond  which  contract  [3]  becomes  the  optimal  contract.  When  s  is  very  large 
(greater  than  0.73  in  this  case),  the  optimal  contract  changes  from  [2]  to  [4]  (piece  rate  in 
kind)  ﬁrst  and  then  to  [3]  (piece  rate  in  cash).  In  other  words,  when  ρ  becomes very  large, 
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a  piece­rate­in­cash  contract  tends  to  dominate  the  other  three  types  of  contracts. 
Figure  2  plots  the  results  when  θ  and  p  are  negatively  correlated  with  a  correlation 
coeﬃcient  of  −
√
2/2.  This  corresponds  to  the  case  in  which  farm­level  yields  are  subject 
to  common  and  idiosyncratic  shocks,  the  variances  of  the  common  and  idiosyncratic  shocks 
are  the  same,  and  the  only  source  of  price  ﬂuctuations  is  the  common  yield  shocks.  As 
discussed  in  the  previous  subsection,  contract  [4]  becomes  more  attractive  due  to  the  low 
variance  of  W4.  Figure  2  shows  that  the  area  under  contract  [4]  expands  in  two  regions. 
First,  between  contract  [1]  and  contract  [2],  there  is  a  horizontal  belt  in  which  contract  [4]  is 
chosen.  This  is  the  case  associated  with  the  corner  solution  e
 ∗ 
4  =  0.  Although  the  expected

output  is  the  same  under  all  of  the  four  contracts,  contract  [4]  is  the  most  preferred  because 
the  negative  correlation  between  θ  and  p  has  the  advantage  of  providing  an  income  risk 
hedge.  When  s  becomes  larger,  this  advantage  is  dominated  by  the  advantage  of  contract  [2] 
so  that  contract  [2]  becomes  the  most  preferred.  Another  region  where  contract  [4]  becomes 
more  attractive  is  for  medium  values  of  ρ.  When  θ  and  p  are  independent,  contract  [3]  is  the 
most  preferred  one,  while  contract  [4]  becomes  more  attractive  when  θ  and  p  are  negatively 
correlated  because  the  negative  correlation  means  that  contract  [4]  oﬀers  the  advantage  of 
providing  an  income  risk  hedge.  When  ρ  becomes  very  large,  the  piece­rate­in­cash  contract 
becomes  the  most  attractive  one,  as  is  the  case  of  Figure  1. 
Both  propositions  stipulated  above  are  satisﬁed  in  these  examples.  A  stronger  version  of 
Proposition  1,  i.e.,  that  an  increase  in  the  share  of  food  in  the  laborer’s  household  budget  will 
increase  the  probability  of  a  contract  with  in­kind  wages  against  a  contract  with  cash  wages, 
is  not  satisﬁed  because  there  is  a  region  where  the  indiﬀerence  curve  between  contracts  [3] 
and  [4]  is  negatively  sloped  in  Figure  2 and  the  indiﬀerence  curve  between  contracts  [3]  and  [2] 
is  negatively  sloped  in  Figure  1.  A  kind  of  non­monotonic  relationship  is  thus  found  between 
the  optimal  contract  choice  and  parameter  s,  leading  to  non­convexity  in  the  parameter 
space  (s, ρ) for  contracts  [3]  or  [4]. 
4  The  Determinants  of  Contract  Choice 
4.1  Empirical  Strategy 
Based  on  the  theoretical  model  above,  this  section  empirically  investigates  the  determinants 
of  the  choice  of  contract  among  the  four  alternatives.  Let  Iji  be  an  indicator  function  taking 
the  value  of  1  when  the  contract  adopted  in  observation  i  is  j  and  0  otherwise  (j=1:  time 
wage  in  cash,  j=2:  time  wage  in  kind,  j=3:  piece  rate  in  cash,  and  j=4:  piece  rate  in  kind). 
It  is  assumed  that  there  exists  a  latent  variable  I
 ∗ 
ji  such  that 






h(Zi) +  �ji  >  0,  (11) and  Iji  = 0  otherwise,  where  h(.)  is  a  function  determining  the  latent  variable  and  Zi  are 
variables  in  the  function.  The  function  h(.)  can  be  derived  implicitly  from  the  optimization 
problem  described  in  the  previous  section.  In  this  sense,  the  empirical  exercises  in  this  paper 
are  based  on  a  reduced­form  approach. 
Two  speciﬁcations  are  attempted  in  this  paper  to  characterize  the  reduced­form  function 
h(.).  First,  a  multinomial  logit  model  covering  the  four  exclusive  regimes  (j  = 1,2,3,4)  is 
estimated.  The  multinomial  logit  model  is  speciﬁed  as 
exp(Ziβj)
Prob(Iji  = 1)  =  � 
k=2,3,4  exp(Ziβk)
, j  = 2,3,4,  (12) 
where  βj  is  a  vector  of  coeﬃcients  to  be  estimated,  which  characterize  the  wage  contract 
choice  j. 9  When  a  coeﬃcient  in  vector  βj  on  a  particular  variable  Zk  is  positive  (negative), 
this  implies  that  the  logarithm  of  the  odds  ratio  of  choosing  j  over  default  contract  [1]  (time 
wage  in  cash)  increases  (decreases)  with  Zk . 
The  second  speciﬁcation  is  a  single­equation  probit  model,  estimated  by  merging  con­
tracts  [2]  and  [4]  into  a  new  dummy  variable  for  in­kind  wage  contracts,  and  contracts  [3] 
and  [4]  into  a  new  dummy  variable  for  piece­rate  contracts.  The  probit  model  is  speciﬁed  as 
Prob(I2i  = 1  or  I4i  = 1)  = Φ(Ziβkd),  (13) 
Prob(I3i  = 1  or  I4i  = 1)  = Φ(Ziβpr),  (14) 
where  Φ(.) is  the  distribution  function  of  a  standard  normal  variable  and  the  βs  are  vectors 
of  coeﬃcients  to  be  estimated.  Each  of  the  probit  models  is  estimated  separately.  There 
are  two  reasons  for  trying  the  second  speciﬁcation.  The  ﬁrst  is  to  incorporate  the  non­
monotonicity  of  the  functional  form  of  h(.).  The  numerical  examples  in  Section  3  have 
shown  that  when  the  four  exclusive  regimes  are  treated  simultaneously,  the  probability  of 
choosing  a  contract  other  than  j  = 1  may  be  a  non­monotonic  function  of  s  (the  food  share 
in  family  consumption).  Because  of  this  non­convexity,  approximating  h(.)  linearly  may 
not  be  appropriate  when  all  of  the  four  exclusive  regimes  are  analyzed  in  a  multinomial 
framework.  By  merging  contracts  [3]  and  [4]  or  contracts  [2]  and  [4],  the  optimal  contract 
regions  shown  in  Figures  1  and  2  become  less  non­convex.  Another  reason  for  adopting 
the  probit  speciﬁcation  is  the  unbalanced  distribution  of  regimes  in  the  current  dataset. 
As  shown  in  Table  5,  the  frequency  of  contract  [4]  is  low.  By  merging  contract  [4]  with 
contracts  [2]  or  [3],  the  maximum  likelihood  estimation  of  the  probit  model  is  expected  to 
be  well­behaved. 
Alternative  approaches  would  be  to  adopt  a  multinomial  probit  framework  or  to  model  sequential  decision 
making  in  which  the  two  parties  ﬁrst  choose  between  in­kind  and  cash  wages  and  then  between  time  and 
incentive  wages.  An  examination  of  the  robustness  of  the  estimation  results  under  these  speciﬁcations  is  left 
for  a  future  study. 
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9Three  types  of  explanatory  variables  are  included  in  Zi  in  the  multinomial  logit  and  the 
single­equation  probit  models.  The  ﬁrst  type  includes  variables  characterizing  the  employee 
(laborer).  As  discussed  in  Section  3,  employee  characteristics  such  as  food  security  concerns, 
risk  aversion,  and  the  willingness  to  make  an  eﬀort,  should  aﬀect  the  contract  choice.  Note 
that  some  of  the  employee  characteristics  are  individual  attributes  such  as  age,  education, 
and  sex,  while  others  are  household  attributes  such  as  consumption  preferences,  asset  hold­
ings,  and  household  size.  The  second  type  of  explanatory  variables  in  vector  Zi  include 
variables  characterizing  the  employer  (farmer).  Individual  and  household  characteristics  of 
the  employer  similar  to  those  listed  for  the  employee  may  aﬀect  the  contract  choice.  The 
third  type  of  explanatory  variables  control  for  the  ﬁxed  eﬀects  of  villages,  crops,  and  farming 
operations.  Because  the  mode  of  wage  payments  tends  to  be  similar  within  a  village  for  a 
speciﬁc  crop  and  a  particular  job,  it  is  better  to  control  for  these  eﬀects  to  obtain  reliable 
estimates  for  the  eﬀects  of  individual  and  household  characteristics  on  the  choice  of  contract. 
In  other  words,  the  within­village  variation  of  wage  contracts  observed  for  the  same  crop  and 
for  the  same  farming  operation  is  utilized  to  identify  the  model.  Since  it  is  not  possible  to 
completely  match  employee  and  employer  data,  both  the  employee  and  the  employer  char­
acteristics  are  measured  as  deviations  from  their  village­level  means  and  then  the  employee 
data  and  the  employer  data  are  pooled.  This  approach  entails  an  eﬃciency  gain  in  estimation 
since  it  imposes  the  restriction  that  village,  crop,  and  operation  ﬁxed  eﬀects  are  the  same 
no  matter  whether  employee  or  employer  data  are  used.  In  addition,  in  order  to  provide  a 
robustness  check,  the  results  for  the  estimation  using  employee  data  only  will  be  reported. 
Thus,  the  main  empirical  test  concerns  whether  individual/household  characteristics  that 
are  proxies  for  s  and  ρ  aﬀect  the  contract  choice  in  a  way  predicted  by  the  theoretical  model. 
An  additional  task  is  to  examine  the  ﬁtted  values  of  the  ﬁxed  eﬀects  and  thereby to  investigate 
whether  piece  rate  contracts  are  more  likely  to  be  adopted  for  crops  and  farm  operation  that 
require  quick  completion  and  whether  in­kind  wages  are  more  likely  to  be  adopted  for  crops 
and  farm  operation  that  are  closely  related  with  subsistence  food  requirements. 
In  order  to  examine  the  eﬀect  of  individual  and  household  characteristics  on  the  contract 
choice,  the  following  variables,  both  for  workers  and  for  employers,  are  included  (see  Table  6 
for  a  detailed  list  of  the  variables).10  First,  as  demographic  controls,  sex  and  age  are  included. 
The  sex  dummy  of  the  employer  is,  however,  deleted  from  the  ﬁnal  model  since  the  majority 
of  employers  are  male.  Second,  to  represent  human  capital,  the  level  of  education  (in  terms 
of  schooling  years)  is  included.  Third,  the  size  of  the  farmland  workers  and  employers  possess 
is  included. For  workers,  this  provides  an  indication  of  the  extent  to  which  they  can  secure 
food  from  their  own  farmland.  Therefore,  if  it  is  found  that  the  worker’s  farmland  reduces 
All  empirical  variables  used  in  the  regression  analysis  are  available  on  request  for  veriﬁcation. 
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10the  probability  of  contract  [2]  and  [4],  such  a  ﬁnding  is  consistent  with  the  food  security 
concern  modeled  in  the  previous  section.  For  employers,  the  farmland  size  controls  for  their 
farming  assets.  Fourth,  non­land  asset  values  such  as  livestock,  transportation  equipment, 
etc.,  are  included.  This  variable  controls  for  liquidity  eﬀects.  When  workers  have  few  assets 
and  as  a  result  are  more  likely  to  be  liquidity  constrained,  they  prefer  cash  wages  to  increase 
their  liquidity.  Similarly,  when  employers  have  few  assets  and  hence  are  more  likely  to  be 
liquidity  constrained,  they  prefer  to  pay  in­kind  wages  to  preserve  their  liquidity.  Fifth,  as 
a  direct  control  for  household  food  security  concerns,  the  relative  importance  of  rice  in  the 
family  budget  is  included.11 
4.2  Main  Estimation  Results 
The  estimation  results  for  the  multinomial  logit  model  are  reported  in  Table  7.  First,  which 
factors  aﬀect  the  probability  that  labor  contracts  paid  in  ﬁxed  amounts  of  food  (contract  [2]) 
against  time  wages  in  cash  (contract  [1])  are  chosen?  The  regression  results  show  that  the 
smaller  a  worker’s  farmland  and  the  larger  the  rice  share  in  his  family  budget,  the  more  likely 
he  is  to  be  paid  in  kind.  This  is  exactly  what  the  theoretical  model  predicted  for  the  case 
when  food  security  concerns  were  present  (see  Figures  1  and  2  in  Section  3).  A  worker  with 
a  higher  value  for  S  labor  (the  proxy  for  s)  is  more  likely  to  work  under  in­kind  payment 
schemes  because  food  consumption  is  more  important  for  him  than  for  a  worker  with  a 
lower  value  for  S  labor.  At  the  same  time,  for  a  given  level  of  S  labor,  the  more  farmland  a 
worker  possesses/controls,  the  greater  is  his  food  security  because  he  can  produce  food  on 
his  own  farm  and  does  not  have  to  rely  on  the  market.  The  coeﬃcients  on  the  other  worker 
characteristic  variables  are  insigniﬁcant.  Turning  to  employer  characteristics,  Land  farmer 
and  S  farmer  raise  the  probability  that  contract  [2]  is  chosen  over  contract  [1].  The  reason 
for  a  farmer  with  more  farmland  to  adopt  contract  [2]  could  be  the  saving  of  wage  payments 
through  the  adoption  of  in­kind  wages:  the  abundance  of  food  on  his  farm  implies  that  the 
shadow  price  of  the  food  for  the  farmer  is  likely  to  be  lower  than  its  shadow  price  for  the 
laborer.  It  turns  out  that  the  eﬀect  of  S  farmer  on  the  likelihood  of  contract  [2]  being  chosen 
over  contract  [1]  is  not  robust. 
The  coeﬃcients  on  the  crop  ﬁxed  eﬀects  show  that  it  is  more  likely  that  paddy  crops, 
including  monsoon  paddy  (the  reference  crop),  are  cultivated  under  the  in­kind  wage  ar­
rangement.  The  coeﬃcients  on  the  operation  ﬁxed  eﬀects  show  that  wages  ﬁxed  in  kind  are 
11To  control  for  the  endogeneity  of  s  (the  food  budget  share  in  the  theoretical  model),  the  empirical  model 
uses  the  value  of  the  annual  amount  of  rice  consumption  required  (age­sex  speciﬁc  rice  consumption  coeﬃcients 
times  the  vector  of  the  demographic  composition  of  household  members)  divided  by  the  expected  household 
income  (asset­speciﬁc  income  coeﬃcients  times  the  vector  of  asset  holdings)  as  a  proxy  for  the  importance  of 
rice  in  the  family  budget.  The  empirical  variable  is  more  exogenous  to  households’  short­run  decision  making 
than  the  observed  value  of  the  food  budget  share. 
18 more  common  in  harvesting  than  in  other  operations.  These  results  are  as  expected  because 
paddy  crops  are  grown  mainly  for  consumption  so  that  the  harvest  of  these  crops  can  be 
readily  paid  to  harvesting  workers  on  the  spot,  while  other  crops  are  grown  mainly  as  cash 
crops. 
Second,  which  factors  aﬀect  the  probability  of  contract  [3]  (piece  rate  in  cash)  being 
chosen  over  contract  [1]?  The  regression  results  show  that  female  or  more  educated  workers 
are  more  likely  to  be  oﬀered  time  wages  in  cash  rather  than  piece  rates  in  cash.  This 
suggests  that  such  workers  are  more  disciplined  or  tend  to  work  under  closer  supervision  by 
the  farmer  so  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  provide  them  with  eﬀort­based  incentives.12  The 
variable  S  labor  has  a  signiﬁcant  negative  coeﬃcient.  Numerical  examples  in  the  theoretical 
section  showed  that  the  direction  of  the  eﬀects  of  s  on  the  probability  of  contract  [3]  being 
chosen  is  indeterminate  and  depends  on  the  functional  form  of  g(e) (the  welfare  cost  of  eﬀort 
to  the  worker).  The  estimation  results  show  that  the  eﬀect  is  negative.  This  could  be  due 
to  the  fact  that  piece  rates  in  cash  do  not  contribute  much  to  the  improvement  of  household 
food  security  when  the  food  market  is  highly  volatile. 
Among  the  employer  characteristics,  education  and  landholding  increase  the  probability 
of  piece  rate  contracts  being  chosen.  The  eﬀect  of  education  could  be  interpreted  in  two 
ways:  the  opportunity  cost  for  an  educated  farmer  to  monitor  labor  is  higher  because  of 
non­agricultural  work  opportunities  for  the  educated;  or  educated  farmers  tend  to  adopt 
technologies  that  require  more  eﬀort  of  workers.  The  positive  eﬀect  of  landholding  implies 
that  farmers  with  larger  farms  are  disadvantaged  in  completing  farming  operations  in  time 
so  that  they  adopt  piece  rates  to  speed  up  the  completion. 
The  coeﬃcients  on  the  crop  ﬁxed  eﬀects  in  determining  contract  [3]  show  that  it  is  more 
likely  that  monsoon  paddy  (the  reference  crop)  and  summer  paddy  are  cultivated  under 
the  piece­rate  arrangement  than  oilseeds  and  vegetables.  This  is  consistent  with  the  claim 
in  the  literature  that  paddy  cultivation  requires  more  eﬀort  than  other  crops  (Hayami  and 
Otsuka,  1993;  Hayami  and  Kikuchi,  1999).  To  grow  oilseeds,  the  optimal  eﬀort  level  may 
be  less  than  the  optimal  level  required  for  other  crops.  In  the  case  of  vegetable  cultivation, 
the  interpretation  could  be  more  subtle:  vegetables  require  careful  labor,  which  may  not  be 
available  through  a  piece­rate  arrangement  because  of  the  quality­quantity  trade­oﬀ  (Paarsch 
and  Shearer,  2000).  Among  the  operation  ﬁxed  eﬀects  variables,  Planting  has  a  signiﬁcant 
positive  coeﬃcient.  This  suggests  that  planting  requires  quick  completion  so  that  piece  rates 
are  likely  to  be  chosen. 
Third,  turning  to  what  variables  determine  if  contract  [4]  (piece  rate  in  kind,  i.e.,  share­
Takahashi  (2000)  reported  that  in  rural  Myanmar,  female  laborers  tend  to  work  in  ﬁeld  plots  closer  to 
the  farmer’s  residence  while  male  laborers  tend  to  work  far  away  from  the  residence  so  that  more  eﬀort­based 
incentives  are  required  for  male  laborers. 
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12cropping  arrangements)  is  chosen  against  contract  [1],  the  value  of  workers’  assets  and  farm­
ers’  age  have  positive  and  signiﬁcant  coeﬃcients.  The  former  variable  indicates  that  workers 
with  fewer  assets  prefer  being  paid  in  cash,  i.e.,  they  seek  liquidity.  Note  that  the  coeﬃcient 
on  Asset  labor  in  determining  contract  [2]  is  also  positive,  though  only  marginally  signiﬁcant 
at  the  20%  level.  The  latter  eﬀect  of  farmers’  age  may  capture  the  eﬀect  of  history,  since 
contract  [4]  is  the  oldest  form  of  wage  mode  in  the  survey  villages.  As  a  whole,  few  of  the 
variables  in  the  estimation  for  contract  [4]  are  statistically  signiﬁcant.  This  could  be  due  to 
the  smaller  number  of  observations  falling  under  contract  [4]. 
Because  of  this  indeterminacy  for  contract  [4],  the  alternative  speciﬁcation  consisting 
of  single­equation  probit  models  was  estimated  and  the  results  are  reported  in  Table  8. 
In  the  middle  columns  of  Table  8,  the  determinants  for  the  adoption  of  in­kind  wages  are 
shown.  The  signs  on  the  coeﬃcient  for  individual  characteristics  are  very  similar  to  those  in 
the  multinomial  logit  model  explaining  contract  [2],  and  when  the  coeﬃcient  is  statistically 
signiﬁcant,  the  signs  are  exactly  the  same.  Employee  landholdings  decrease  the  probability 
of  in­kind  wages  being  chosen  and  a  larger  food  share  in  the  laborer’s  budget  is  associated 
with  a  higher  probability  of  in­kind  wages  being  chosen.  The  level  of  statistical  signiﬁcance 
is  improved  for  these  two  variables.  The  eﬀect  of  the  value  of  workers’  assets  now  becomes 
signiﬁcantly  positive  and  that  of  employers’  assets  now  becomes  signiﬁcantly  negative.  This 
pattern  is  consistent  with  the  explanation  based  on  liquidity  constraints. 
Comparing  the  probit  model  for  piece­rate  contracts  and  the  logit  model  for  contract  [3], 
the  results  are  again  qualitatively  similar  in  terms  of  the  signs  and  the  statistical  signiﬁcance 
of  individual  characteristics. Female  workers,  educated  workers,  and  those  with  a  high  food 
budget  share  are  less  likely  to  work  under  piece­rate  contracts,  while  educated  employers 
and  employers  with  more  farmland  are  more  likely  to  employ  workers  under  piece­rate  con­
tracts.  In  addition  to  the  eﬀect  of  farmers’  education,  the  eﬀect  of  farmers’  age  now  becomes 
statistically  signiﬁcant.  The  age  eﬀect  can  be  interpreted  in  two  ways:  the  opportunity  cost 
for  an  elderly  farmer  to  monitor  labor  is  higher  because  of  high  age;  or  elderly  farmers  tend 
to  adopt  technologies  that  require  more  eﬀort  of  workers.  In  both  probit  models,  the  ﬁxed 
eﬀects  were  jointly  signiﬁcant  at  the  1%  level. 
4.3  Robustness  of  the  Estimation  Results 
In  Table  9,  regression  results  under  alternative  estimation  procedures  are  presented  to  check 
the  robustness  of  the  ﬁndings  above.  The  estimated  coeﬃcients  on  the  ﬁxed  eﬀects  are  very 
similar  to  those  reported  in  Tables  7  and  8  so  that  they  are  not  reported  in  this  table. 
In  Part  A,  contract  [4]  is  merged  with  contract  [2]  or  contract  [3]  and  multinomial  logit 
models  with  three  choices  are  estimated.  This  speciﬁcation  allows  a  more  direct  comparison 
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between  the  multinomial  logit  results  and  the  probit  results.  When  contract  [4]  is  merged 
with  contract  [2],  the  level  of  signiﬁcance  of  the  eﬀects  of  land  labor  and  S  labor  deteriorates 
to  20%.  However,  the  signs  are  the  same  as  before  and  their  estimated  marginal  eﬀects 
on  the  probability  are  comparable  to  the  results  from  the  other  speciﬁcations  in  which  the 
coeﬃcients  were  more  signiﬁcant.  Otherwise,  the  results  reported  in  Part  A  are  qualitatively 
similar  to  those  in  Table  8. 
In  Part  B  of  Table  9,  the  multinomial  logit  or  the  probit  model  is  re­estimated  using 
employee  data  only.  The  signs  and  the  levels  of  signiﬁcance  of  individual  characteristics 
overall  are  consistent  with  those  reported  in  Tables  7  and  8.  In  none  of  the  cases  has  the 
same  variable  a  statistically  signiﬁcant  coeﬃcient  with  the  opposite  sign.  However,  individual 
determinants  for  contract  [3]  (multinomial  logit)  or  contracts  [3]  and  [4]  (probit)  become 
statistically  insigniﬁcant.  In  contrast,  the  negative  eﬀect  of  land  labor  and  the  positive  eﬀect 
of  S  labor  on  contract  [2]  or  in­kind  wages  are  more  robust. 
In  Part  C  of  Table  9,  more  parsimonious  models  are  estimated,  where  variables  that  were 
statistically  insigniﬁcant  in  all  speciﬁcations  are  deleted  from  the  list  of  explanatory  variables. 
The  positive  eﬀect  of  S  labor  and  the  negative  eﬀect  of  land  labor  on  in­kind  wages,  and  the 
positive  eﬀect  of  Age  farmer  and  Educ  farmer  as  well  as  the  negative  eﬀect  of  Female  labor, 
Age  labor,  and  S  labor  on  piece­rate  wages  are  strengthened  in  these  speciﬁcations.  In  addi­
tion  to  the  results  reported  in  Table  9,  diﬀerent  deﬁnitions  are  also  attempted  for  education 
and  land,13  the  asset  value  variable  is  disaggregated  into  each  source  of  assets,  and  models 
are  re­estimated  using  weighted  regression  with  total  man­days  or  total  Kyats  as  weights  to 
correct  for  the  diﬀerence  in  the  importance  of  each wage  mode  in  the  rural  economy.  The 
results  from  these  models  are  qualitatively  the  same  as  those  reported  in  this  paper. 
As  an  alternative  strategy  to  check  the  robustness  of  the  results  regarding  the  determi­
nants  of  in­kind  contracts,  household­level  regressions  are  also  attempted.  As  shown  in  the 
theoretical  model,  whether  in­kind  contracts  are  adopted  depends  on  household  character­
istics  such  as  risk  aversion  and  the  importance  of  rice  consumption  in  the  family  budget. 
Since  food  security  should  be  evaluated  at  the  household  level,  not  at  the  individual  contract 
level,  it  might  be  more  meaningful  to  examine  the  determinants  of  the  relative  importance  of 
in­kind  labor  at  the  household  level.  In  other  words,  household­level  regressions  could  be  a 
better  way  to  assess  the  importance  of  food  security  concerns  with  regard  to  contract  choice, 
since  the  worker  can  mix  diﬀerent  types  of  contracts. For  this  reason,  the  man­day  share  of 
in­kind  labor  in  total  household  casual  farm  labor  is  regressed  on  household characteristics 
Instead  of  deﬁning  education  as  the  sum  of  years  of  formal  and  monastic  schooling,  only  years  at  formal 
schools  are  counted;  instead  of  using  the  total  size  of  farmland  (i.e.,  the  simple  sum  of  the  acreage  of  paddy 
and  non­paddy  ﬁelds),  farmsize  is  calculated  as  the  weighted  sum  of  the  acreage  of  paddy  and  non­paddy 
ﬁelds  with  a  smaller  weight  on  the  latter. 
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13and  village  ﬁxed  eﬀects.  The  main  variables  of  interest  are  the  household  characteristics 
corresponding  to  those  adopted  in  Tables  7  to  9.  In  addition  to  these  variables,  demographic 
characteristics  are  included  to  control  for  other  diﬀerences  in  preferences.  The  crop  and  oper­
ation  ﬁxed  eﬀects  are  now  dropped  since  the  composition  of  crops/operations  is  endogenous 
at  the  household  level  after  aggregating  individual  contracts. 
The  estimation  results  are  reported  in  Table  10.  In  the  upper  portion,  the  OLS  estimation 
results  with  robust  standard  errors  are  reported.  To  take  into  account  the  double  censoring 
at  zero  and  one  because  the  dependent  variable  is  a  share,  a  tobit  model  is  also  estimated 
and  the  results  are  reported  in  the  lower  portion.  Both  the  negative  eﬀect  of  land  holding 
and  the  positive  eﬀect  of  the  importance  of  rice  consumption  are  statistically  signiﬁcant  in 
all  six  speciﬁcations.  The  tobit  results  indicate  that  conditional  on  it  being  strictly  positive, 
the  share  of  in­kind  contracts  increases  as  the  share  of  rice  consumption  increases,  with 
an  elasticity  of  0.7  to  0.9.  In  the  OLS  results,  the  coeﬃcients  are  much  smaller  because 
of  the  large  number  of  left­censored  observations,  but  the  signiﬁcance  levels  are  similar 
to  those  of  the  tobit  results.  In  the  tobit  results,  the  dummy  variable  for  female­headed 
households  becomes  signiﬁcantly  positive.  This  can  be  interpreted  as  another  (although 
weak)  piece  of  evidence  that  households’  food security  concerns  aﬀect  contract  choice  because 
in  rural  Myanmar  females  are  usually  responsible  for  family  food  management.  Therefore, 
the  household­level  regression  provides  further  evidence  of  the  important  role  food  security 
concerns  play  when  laborer  households  decide  how  to  allocate  their  work  to  diﬀerent  types 
of  wage  contracts. 
Overall,  the  regression  results  are  consistent  with  the  theoretical  prediction  of  this  paper: 
a  farmer  carefully  chooses  and  oﬀers  to  a  worker  a  wage  payment  mode  that  is  optimal 
for  the  farmer  in  subtracting  most  of  the  economic  surplus  from  the  labor  transaction, 
considering  the  characteristics  of  the  worker  and  the  farm  operation.  This  mechanism  reduces 
the  opportunity  for  the  worker  to  shirk  and  meets  the  food  security  concern  of  the  worker.  In 
Subsection  2.3,  it  was  found  that  casual  labor  in  crop  production  was  as  eﬃcient  as  family 
labor  (Table  4).  That  ﬁnding  could  be  interpreted  as  a  result  of  the  choice  of  the  wage 
contract  type  and  should  not  be  interpreted  as  any  evidence  of  the  non­existence  of  moral 
hazard  possibilities  in  rural  Myanmar. 
One  caveat  with  regard  to  the  analysis  of  contract  choice  above  is  that  endogenous 
matching  is  not  controlled  for.  If  the  multinomial  logit  or  the  probit  model  is  correctly 
speciﬁed,  each  variable  is  measured  correctly,  and  there  is  no  inherent  heterogeneity  that 
determines  the  contract  choice  (so­called  exogenous  or  random  matching),  then  the  regression 
gives  consistent  estimates  for  βj,  βpr,  or  βkd.  If,  however,  some  of  the  variables  that  determine 
the  matching  are  omitted  or  there  exists  inherent,  unobservable  heterogeneity  (endogenous 
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matching),  then  the  estimates  for  β  are  inconsistent.  To  avoid  such  bias  due  to  endogenous 
matching,  an  instrumental  variable  estimation  employing  variables  that  aﬀect  the  matching 
equation  but  not  the  choice  of  contract  would  be  necessary  (Ackerberg  and  Botticini,  2002). 
Unfortunately,  our  dataset  does  not  contain  instruments  that  satisfy  this  condition. 
Conclusion 
This  paper  developed  an  agency  model  of  contract  choice  in  the  hiring  of  labor  and  estimated 
the  determinants  of  the  choice  in  rural  Myanmar  based  on  the  model.  As  a  salient  feature 
relevant  for  the  agricultural  sector  in  a  low  income  country  such  as  Myanmar,  the  agency 
model  incorporates  considerations  of  food  security  as  well  as  incentive  issues.  It  was  shown 
that  when  food  security  considerations  are  important  for  an  employee  (agent),  possibly  due 
to  poverty,  and  food  markets  are  thin,  the  employer  (principal)  prefers  a  contract  with  wages 
paid  in  kind  (food)  to  one  with  wages  paid  in  cash.  At  the  same  time,  when  output  is  more 
responsive  to  workers’  eﬀort  and  the  employer  is  less  able  to  enforce  workers’  eﬀort  levels, 
the  employer  prefers  a  contract  with  piece­rate  wages  to  one  with  hourly  wages.  The  case  of 
sharecropping  can  be  understood  as  a  combination  of  the  two:  piece­rate  wages  paid  in  kind. 
Numerical  examples  indicated  the  possibility  of  a  non­monotonic  relationship  between  the 
optimal  contract  choice  and  the  parameters  determining  food  security  and  moral  hazard. 
These  predictions  of  the  theoretical  model  were  tested  using  a  cross­section  dataset  based 
on  a  sample  household  survey  conducted  in  2001  that  covers  diverse  agro­ecological  environ­
ments  in  Myanmar.  The  estimation  results  of  multinomial  logit  and  probit  models  at  the 
individual  contract  level  and  OLS  and  tobit  models  at  the  household  level  showed  that  in­
kind  wages  are  more  likely  to  be  adopted  the  higher  the  share  of  food  in  workers’  budget  and 
the  less  farmland  they  had  under  management;  both  factors  are  characteristics  of  poverty 
in  the  study  region  and  associated  with  greater  concerns  for  food  security.  Piece­rate  wages 
are  more  likely  to  be  adopted  when  workers  are  male  and  uneducated.  Such  workers  are 
more  likely  to  work  under  conditions  where  the  enforcement  of  eﬀort  is  diﬃcult.  Piece­rate 
wages  are  more  likely  to  be  adopted  when  employers  are  older  and  more  educated.  The  ﬁxed 
eﬀects  of  crops  and  farming  operations  are  jointly  signiﬁcant  and  crops  or  operations  re­
quiring  greater  eﬀort  are  associated  with  piece­rate  contracts.  These  results  seem  consistent 
with  the  theoretical  predictions.  Selection  into  contracts  thus  could  be  one  of  the  reasons  for 
ﬁnding  no  adverse  eﬀects  of  casual  labor  on  farm  productivity  when  production  functions 
were  estimated  using  the  same  dataset. 
The  regression  results  reported  in  this  paper  are  based  on  a  reduced­form  approach,  so 
that  the  non­monotonic  relationship  of  the  optimal  contract  choice  is  not  well  incorporated. 
Simulation­based  econometrics,  in  which  the  structural  model  of  optimization  is  re­produced 
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numerically  and  the  structural  parameters  of  the  model  are  estimated,  may  be  required  to 
rigorously  incorporate  such  non­linearity. 14  As  a  further  extension,  intra­household  interac­
tions  among  family  members  need  to  be  incorporated  into  the  theoretical  model,  since  such 
interaction  de  facto  allows  a  mix  of  diﬀerent  contracts.  Another  issue  that  has  remained 
unexamined  in  this  paper  is  the  contract  selection  for  permanent  labor.  The  production 
function  estimates  showed  no  adverse  eﬀect  (or  favorable  eﬀect,  if  any)  of  permanent  labor 
on  farm  productivity.  This  could  be  due  to  a  mechanism  in  which  contract  choice  based  on 
kinship  and  reputation  increases  the  production  incentive  for  permanent  laborers  in  Myan­
mar. Testing  this  hypothesis  and  then  re­estimating  the  production  function  controlling  for 
the  endogeneity  of  contract  choice  are  interesting  topics  for  future  research. 
See,  for  example,  Fafchamps  (1993)  and  Fafchamps  and  Soderbom  (2002)  for  attempts  at  structural 
estimation  based  on  a  primal  optimization  model. 
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Appendix:  Details  of  the  Numerical  Model 
The  principal’s  production  function  is  speciﬁed  as 
f(e) =  A(1  +  e)ρ ,  (15) 
where  A  (a  positive  parameter  determining  the  productivity)  is  set  at  5 and  ρ  (a  non­negative 
parameter  that  characterizes  the  eﬀort  elasticity  of  output)  is  parametrically  changed  in  the 
range  from  zero  to  0.50.  1+e  is  interpreted  as  the  total  eﬀort,  1  is  the  minimum  eﬀort,  and 
e  is  the  additional  eﬀort. 
The  distribution  of  food  price  p  is  assumed  to  be  a  symmetric  binomial15  with  eleven 
nodes,16  a  mean  of  one,  and  a  coeﬃcient  of  variation  of  0.25.  The  distribution  of  output 
risk  θ  is  also  assumed  to  be  a  symmetric  binomial  with  eleven  nodes,  a  mean  of  one,  and  a 
coeﬃcient  of  variation  of  0.10.  The  correlation  between  p  and  θ  is  parametrically  changed. 
We  ﬁrst  simulate  the  case  when  p  and  θ  are  independent,  i.e.,  no  common  yield  shocks  so  that 
the  price  ﬂuctuates  due  to  demand­side  shocks  only  (Figure  1).  The  second  simulation  is  for 
the  case  when  p  and  θ  are  completely  negatively  correlated  (no  idiosyncratic  yield  shocks 
and  the  only  source  of  price  ﬂuctuations  is  from  the  supply  side).  By  taking  the  weighted 
average  of  the  two,  we  can  simulate  plausible  cases  in  the  context  of  developing  countries, 
where  both  idiosyncratic  and  common  yield  shocks  are  important.  When  the  weight  is  0.5, 
the  simulation  corresponds  to  the  case  in  which  farm­level  yields  are  subject  to  common  and 
idiosyncratic  shocks  whose  variances  are  of  the  same  magnitude  and  the  only  source  of  price 
ﬂuctuations  is  the  common  yield  shock.  The  correlation  coeﬃcient  for  this  case  is  −
√
2/2 
(Figure  2). 
The  indirect  utility  function  in  the  agent’s  payoﬀ  function  is  speciﬁed  with  the  linear 
expenditure  system 
1  y  − pγ 
�1−φ 
, v(y,p) =
1 − φ 
(16) β p
where  φ  is  a  positive  parameter  determining  the  risk  aversion,17  γ  is  the  subsistence  food 
requirement  and  β  is  the  marginal  propensity  to  spend  on  food  after  meeting  subsistence 
needs.  For  simplicity,  the  non­food  subsistence  requirement  is  set  at  zero.  In  the  simulation, 
φ  is  parametrically  changed  in  the  range  from  1.1  to  4,18  β  is  assumed  to  be  the  same  as  γ 
15Note  that  binomial  distribution  can  be  interpreted  as  an  approximation  of  normal  distribution. 
16To  avoid  extreme  values  for  the  food  price  that  lead  to  the  case  in  which  the  subsistence  food  value  is 
larger  than  the  worker’s  income,  the  number  of  nodes  cannot  be  large  as  long  as  a  binomial  distribution  is 
adopted.  The  simulation  results  reported  in  this  paper  were  found  to  be  insensitive  to  a  reduction  in  the 
number  of  nodes,  marginal  changes  in  the  probability  values  of  each  node,  or  replacement  of  the  symmetric 
binomial  distribution  with  a  triangle  distribution. 
17Under  this  speciﬁcation,  the  Arrow­Pratt  coeﬃcient  of  relative  risk  aversion,  ψ,  is  deﬁned  as  ψ  =  φy/(y−
pγ). 
18This  range  assures  that  vpp  <  0  for  all  values  of  γ  used  in  the  simulation. 
25 to  reduce  the  dimension  of  the  space  of  parameter  changes,  and  γ  is  parametrically  changed 
in  the  range  from  0.05  to  0.60.  For  each  value  of  γ,  s  (the  budget  share  of  food)  is  evaluated 
at  the  mean  price  under  contract  [1]  (s  = 2γ  − γ2). 
Finally,  the  welfare  cost  of  eﬀort  to  the  worker,  g(e),  is  speciﬁed  as  g(e) =  γe.  A  linear 
form  is  adopted  for  simplicity.  Since  we  parametrically  change  the  values  of  γ  and  β,  function 
g  needs  to  be  measured  in  a  unit  comparable  to  these  values.  If  g(e) =  e,  we  implicitly  reduce 
the  welfare  cost  of  eﬀort  when  we  parametrically  increase  γ,  giving  an  undue  advantage  to 
contract  [3]  over  contract  [1].  The  indiﬀerence  curve  between  contracts  [1]  and  [3]  in  Figure 
1  becomes  highly  negatively  sloped  when  g(e) =  e,  which  is  the  opposite  of  the  regression 
result  that  the  probability  of  contract  [3]  being  chosen  is  negatively  correlated  with  a  proxy 
for  s.  To  avoid  the  highly  negative  slope  between  s  and  the  indiﬀerence  curve  between 
contracts  [1]  and  [3],  we  adopt  the  speciﬁcation  g(e) =  γe. 
The  expected  utility  is  then  evaluated  by  taking  the  probability­weighted  sum  of  the 
utility  under  each  pair  of  realized  values  of  p  and  θ.  For  contracts  [3]  and  [4],  the  optimal 
eﬀort  of  the  laborer  given  w3  or  w4  is  solved  in  the  inner  loop  and  then  the  optimal  wage  rate 
for  the  employer  given  the  inner  loop  is  solved  in  the  next  outer  loop.  This  part  is  solved  by 
the  MINOS  non­linear  optimization  solver  in  GAMS.19  In  the  last  outer  loop,  the  contract 
P that  brings  the  highest  uj  is  chosen. 
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Table 1: Survey Villages 
Name  Division/ State  Township  Village tract  Topology  Irrigation  Major crops 
DELTA1  Ayeyarwady  Myaungmya  Kyonethout  Deltaic  Pump  Paddy 
Division  agric. 
DELTA2  Bago Division  Waw  Acarick  Deltaic  Rainfed,  Paddy, pulses 
agric.  canal 
DRY1  Mandalay  Kyaukse  Pyiban  Dry zone  Canal  Paddy, 
Division  vegetables 
DRY2  Magway  Magway  Kanpyar  Dry zone  Rainfed  Upland crops 
Division 
DRY3  Magway  Taungdwingyi  Wetkathay  Dry zone  Rainfed, tank Upland crops, 
Division  paddy 
HILL1  Shan State  Nyaungshwe  Linkin  Hilly  Rainfed  Vegetables, 
region  paddy, 
sugarcane 
HILL2  Shan State  Kalaw  Myinmahti  Hilly  Rainfed  Vegetables, 
region  paddy 
COAST  Tanintharyi  Myeik  Engamaw  Coastal  Rainfed  Paddy, rubber 
Division  agric. 
29 Table 2: Sample Households 
Number of sample households 
Number of household members included in 












DELTA1  67  33  100  352  158  510 
DELTA2  60  40  100  345  217  562 
DRY1  65  37  102  307  171  478 
DRY2  24  16  40  123  89  212 
DRY3  24  16  40  152  74  226 
HILL1  26  12  38  170  58  228 
HILL2  34  6  40  192  31  223 
COAST  41  20  61  273  138  411 
Total  341  180  521  1914  936  2850 
30 Table 3: Average Assets and Income of Sample Households 
Total current  Household income (Kyats)  Composition of income sources (%) 
Farmland 
value of  Average  Average per- Self-
Agricultural  Agricultural  Non  production  total  capita  employment 
wage income  wage income  agricultural (acres) 
assets* (1000  household  household  income from 
(casual)  (permanent)  income Kyats)  income  income  agriculture 
By village 
DELTA1  5.97  218.2  134,535  30,065  61.5  12.6  2.3  23.6 
DELTA2  7.17  207.8  155,423  29,745  57.3  14.0  10.7  18.0 
DRY1  3.32  232.7  209,661  49,378  61.3  11.1  0.8  26.8 
DRY2  6.13  282.0  216,482  43,975  69.0  10.4  0.0  20.6 
DRY3  6.06  188.5  87,591  17,084  60.5  25.9  3.4  10.2 
HILL1  7.06  225.7  194,807  36,447  53.9  22.7  0.0  23.4 
HILL2  3.92  172.9  169,477  32,147  70.2  11.7  0.0  18.1 
COAST  5.81  579.0  314,478  44,547  33.8  8.6  1.1  56.4 
By household type 
Farm households  8.56  378.6  207,981  39,337  73.6  5.0  0.1  21.2 
Non-farm households  0.01  38.1  138,819  30,191  5.6  34.4  9.5  50.4 
Total  5.62  261.0  184,086  36,177  55.9  12.7  2.6  28.8 
Notes: 
* The sum of the values of livestock, agricultural equipment and machinery, and transportation equipment. As for livestock, cattle is the most 
important and the average number of heads of cattle per household is 1.70. With respect to transportation equipment, bullock carts and bicycles 
are the most important (the average numbers per household are 0.41 and 0.47, respectively). 
Household income is defined as the sum of wage/salary receipts including the imputed value of in-kind payments such as meals and rice, non 
agricultural self-employment earnings (gross revenue minus actually paid costs), agricultural self-employment earnings (the sum of the value of 
output minus actually paid costs), and net receipts of non-earned income. Median market prices within each village were used to impute the 
value of non-cash transactions such as the paddy produced by farmers and consumed by themselves and in-kind payments to workers. 
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Table 4: Efficiency of Hired Labor (Cobb-Douglas Production Function Estimates) 
Log of paddy output  Log of paddy value- Log of non-paddy output  Log of non-paddy value-
value per acre  added per acre  value per acre  added per acre 
Log of production factors 
Land under the crop  -0.048  (0.035)  -0.094 *  (0.049)  -0.230 ***  (0.087)  -0.284 **  (0.113) 
Labor in man-days  0.039  (0.063)  0.063  (0.077)  0.136 **  (0.058)  0.242 ***  (0.078) 
Animal labor in days  0.028  (0.032)  0.036  (0.045)  -0.024  (0.075)  0.001  (0.088) 
Machinery in hours  0.008  (0.029)  0.001  (0.037)  0.181 ***  (0.058)  0.257 ***  (0.075) 
Current input in kyats  0.235 ***  (0.049)  0.326 ***  (0.063) 
Household head's schooling years  0.020 *  (0.011)  0.041 ***  (0.012)  0.067 ***  (0.024)  0.120 ***  (0.037) 
Hired labor share 
Permanent labor  0.013  (0.244)  0.475 ***  (0.172)  0.993 ***  (0.375)  1.256 **  (0.514) 
Casual labor  0.139  (0.091)  0.252 **  (0.127)  -0.283  (0.244)  -0.452  (0.364) 
Village fixed effect 
DELTA1  -0.063  (0.189)  -0.251  (0.251) 
DELTA2  -0.049  (0.223)  -0.172  (0.278)  1.070 ***  (0.341)  1.287 ***  (0.478) 
DRY1  0.190  (0.194)  0.103  (0.251)  0.215  (0.287)  -0.172  (0.381) 
DRY2  0.618 **  (0.274)  0.737 **  (0.371) 
DRY3  -0.853 ***  (0.325)  -0.634 *  (0.356)  0.104  (0.304)  -0.026  (0.424) 
HILL2  -0.476 *  (0.275)  -0.313  (0.282)  0.206  (0.310)  -0.104  (0.493) 
COAST  0.268  (0.204)  0.142  (0.277)  0.149  (0.466)  -0.998 ***  (0.352) 
Crop fixed effect 
Summer paddy  0.143 **  (0.072)  0.100  (0.093) 
Upland paddy  -0.456 *  (0.258)  -1.601 ***  (0.294) 
Pulses  -0.334  (0.261)  -0.335  (0.385) 
Oilseeds  0.288  (0.249)  0.522  (0.324) 
Industrial crops  1.251 ***  (0.363)  1.676 ***  (0.426) 
Rubber  0.500  (0.577)  1.529 ***  (0.558) 
Vegetables  0.966 ***  (0.324)  1.629 ***  (0.440) 
Other crops  1.204 ***  (0.405)  1.177 ***  (0.390) 
Intercept  7.634 ***  (0.515)  9.249 ***  (0.415)  6.087 ***  (0.523)  7.757 ***  (0.434) 
Number of observations  316  303  198  190 
F stat for zero slope  23.56  10.49  24.66  14.28 
R-squared  0.531  0.367  0.739  0.574 
Notes: 
(1) Estimated by OLS with Huber-White heteroscedastic robust standard errors (in parentheses). Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*). 
(2) Reference for fixed effects: HILL1 and Monsoon paddy or HILL1 and Cereals. No paddy crops in DRY2. No non-paddy crops in DELTA1. 
(3) Observations with zero or negative output were excluded from the analysis.
32 Table 5: Mode of Wage Payment to Casual Labor 
No. of  Share in the total (%) 
Unweighted 
Weighted by Weighted by observations 
man-days  Kyats 
[1] Time wage in cash 
Kyats/day  2437  78.61  81.36  77.68 
Other  71  2.29  2.25  1.01 
Subtotal  2508  80.90  83.61  78.69 
[2] Time wage in kind 
Cleaned rice/day  65  2.10  1.11  1.99 
Unhusked paddy/day  12  0.39  0.41  1.02 
Subtotal  77  2.49  1.52  3.01 
[3] Piece-rate wage in cash 
Kyats/acre  154  4.97  5.83  6.94 
Kyats for the whole operation  100  3.23  2.53  2.73 
Kyats/unit of farm work  152  4.90  3.21  4.19 
Kyats/unit of crop output  52  1.68  1.68  1.74 
Subtotal  458  14.78  13.25  15.60 
[4] Piece-rate wage in kind 
Sharecropping  4  0.13  0.06  0.15 
Crop output/acre  21  0.68  0.82  1.18 
Crop output for the whole operation  30  0.97  0.71  1.33 
Other  2  0.06  0.02  0.03 
Subtotal  57  1.84  1.61  2.69 
Total  3100  100.00  100.00  100.00 
33 Table 6: Explanatory Variables Used as Determinants of Contract Choice 
Variable  Definition  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Individual and household characteristics 
Female_labor  A dummy variable indicating if the employee is female.  0.292 
Age_labor  Age of the employee.  34.225  11.382  11  69 
Educ_labor  Completed years of formal school education of the  2.818  2.360  0  10 
employee. When the employee attended a monastic school, 
a value of 2 years was assigned. 
Land_labor  Size of farmland holding in acres managed by the  1.835  3.518  0  22 
employee's household. 
S_labor  Indicates the importance of rice in the family budget.  0.463  0.221  0.073  1.000 
Defined as "the value of the annual amount of rice required 
(age-sex specific rice consumption coefficients times the 
vector of the demographic composition)" divided by "the 
expected household income (asset-specific income 
coefficients times the vector of asset holding)". When the 
value was greater than unity, it was truncated at one. 
Assets_labor  Total amount of assets (non-land: transportation  0.064  0.127  0.000  0.924 
equipment, livestock, agricultural machinery, etc.) owned 
by the employee (million Kyats). 
Age_farmer  Age of the employer (=farmer).  43.871  12.193  21  85 
Educ_farmer  Completed years of formal school education of the  3.619  3.395  0  16 
employer (=farmer). When the employer attended a 
monastic school, a value of 2 years was assigned. 
Land_farmer  Size of farmland holding in acres managed by the  8.741  6.102  0.4  37.0633 
household of the employer. 
S_farmer  Importance of rice in the employer's family budget  0.417  0.302  0.0523  1 
(similarly defined as S_labor). 
Assets_farmer  Total amount of assets owned by the employer (similarly  0.343  0.433  0  3.62824 
defined as Assets_labor). 
Crop fixed effects 
Monsoon paddy  Including the late monsoon variety.  #  0.369 
Summer paddy  Grown during the dry season.  0.184 
Upland paddy  Including paddy grown under shifting cultivation.  0.007 
Cereals  Cereal crops other than paddy.  0.018 
Pulses  Pulses such as green gram, black gram, pigeon peas.  0.083 
Oilseeds  Oilseed crops such as sesame, groundnuts, sunflowers.  0.151 
Industrial crops  Industrial crops such as sugarcane.  0.024 
Rubber  Rubber.  0.011 
Vegetables  Vegetables including cabbage, green chilies, tomatoes.  0.138 
Other crops  Other crops.  0.015 
Operation fixed effects 
Planting  Operations before and during the planting stage, such as  0.349 
land preparation, transplanting, planting. 
Middle  Operations during the middle stage, such as irrigation,  0.192 
fertilizing, weeding. 
Harvest  Operations during the harvesting stage, such as harvesting,  0.416 
winnowing, threshing. 
Other operations  All other operations including those overlapping different  #  0.043 
stages. 
Notes: (1) The total number of observations is 3100, of which 1701 are employee data and 1399 are employer data. 
(2) When the variable is a dummy, the percentage of observations taking one is reported. 
(3) In addition to these variables, village fixed effects are also included: DELTA1 (0.210), DELTA2# (0.133), DRY1
(0.208), DRY2 (0.116), DRY3 (0.110), HILL1 (0.119), HILL2 (0.065), and COAST (0.039) (the mean of each dummy 
variable is shown in the parentheses). 
# These dummy variables are used as reference in the regression analysis. 
34 Table 7: Determinants of Contract Choice (Multinomial Logit Estimation Results) 
Reference= [1] Time  [2] Time wage in kind  [3] Piece rate in cash  [4] Piece rate in kind 
wage in cash  Coeff.  Std. Err.  dF/dx  Coeff.  Std. Err.  dF/dx  Coeff.  Std. Err.  dF/dx 
Individual and household characteristics# 
Female_labor  -0.3056  (0.386)  -0.0039  -0.4820 *  (0.285)  -0.0494  -3.7499  (2.939)  -0.0662 
Age_labor  -0.0071  (0.016)  -0.0001  -0.0042  (0.008)  -0.0005  -0.0162  (0.039)  -0.0003 
Educ_labor  -0.0010  (0.085)  0.0006  -0.0747 *  (0.044)  -0.0076  -0.6796  (0.437)  -0.0121 
Land_labor  -0.1223 *  (0.069)  -0.0032  0.0566  (0.037)  0.0075  0.0234  (0.145)  0.0003 
S_labor  1.5159 *  (0.820)  0.0401  -1.1736 **  (0.532)  -0.1588  2.0243  (1.431)  0.0390 
Assets_labor  1.3851  (2.023)  0.0360  -1.4042  (1.471)  -0.1979  5.8948 **  (2.956)  0.1096 
Age_farmer  -0.0048  (0.013)  -0.0002  0.0079  (0.005)  0.0009  0.0322 **  (0.016)  0.0006 
Educ_farmer  -0.0307  (0.062)  -0.0010  0.0600 **  (0.024)  0.0076  0.0261  (0.054)  0.0003 
Land_farmer  0.0639 **  (0.032)  0.0015  0.0265 *  (0.014)  0.0031  -0.0065  (0.051)  -0.0002 
S_farmer  1.0020 *  (0.580)  0.0231  0.3022  (0.229)  0.0342  0.0665  (0.553)  -0.0001 
Assets_farmer  -1.8700  (1.160)  -0.0430  -0.4590 **  (0.196)  -0.0472  -1.3712  (0.879)  -0.0226 
Village fixed effects 
DELTA1  (dropped)  -0.8326 *** (0.192)  -0.1048  (dropped) 
DRY1  4.2700 *** (1.045)  0.1025  -0.0310  (0.195)  -0.0258  2.3028 ***  (0.703)  0.0397 
DRY2  3.1516  (2.236)  0.0771  -0.2091  (0.301)  -0.0379  (dropped) 
DRY3  2.6336 *  (1.551)  0.0656  -0.4924 *  (0.268)  -0.0717  (dropped) 
HILL1  4.4241 *** (1.030)  0.1144  -2.1157 *** (0.372)  -0.2858  1.1803  (0.863)  0.0250 
HILL2  5.5934 *** (1.086)  0.1409  -1.4632 *** (0.408)  -0.2048  (dropped) 
COAST  6.2406 *** (1.093)  0.1555  -1.1964 *** (0.442)  -0.1735  (dropped) 
Crop fixed effects 
Summer paddy  1.1756 *** (0.365)  0.0274  0.2934 **  (0.135)  0.0326  -0.0049  (0.403)  -0.0014 
Upland paddy  2.3469 *** (0.483)  0.0570  -0.0476  (1.216)  -0.0146  (dropped) 
Cereals  (dropped)  0.0068  (0.575)  0.0009  (dropped) 
Pulses  -0.6781  (1.665)  -0.0158  -0.1761  (0.273)  -0.0197  (dropped) 
Oilseeds  -1.9451 **  (0.803)  -0.0456  -0.4154 *  (0.230)  -0.0452  (dropped) 
Industrial crops  (dropped)  0.3570  (0.579)  0.0449  (dropped) 
Rubber  (dropped)  1.4507 **  (0.694)  0.1827  (dropped) 
Vegetables  (dropped)  -0.8085 *** (0.260)  -0.1018  (dropped) 
Other crops  (dropped)  0.1659  (0.777)  0.0209  (dropped) 
Operation fixed effects 
Planting  (dropped)  0.9537 **  (0.439)  0.1201  (dropped) 
Middle  (dropped)  -0.5684  (0.463)  -0.0716  (dropped) 
Harvest  2.5889 *** (0.334)  0.0591  0.4596  (0.440)  0.0369  4.2261 ***  (0.758)  0.0738 
Intercept  -9.3775 *** (1.277)  -1.9475 *** (0.526)  -10.0883 ***  (2.015) 
Pseudo R2  0.267 
Log likelihood  -1407.1 
Notes: # Deviations from the village means were employed in the regression. 
(1) Estimated by a multinomial logit model with Huber-White heteroscedastic robust standard errors (in parentheses). Significant at 1% 
(***), 5% (**), and 10% (*). 
(2) Reference for fixed effects: DELTA2, Monsoon paddy, and Other operations. See Table 6 for a list of the dummy variables.
(3) The number of observations used is 3,100.
(4) dF/dX shows the marginal effect of the explanatory variable (in the case of dummy variables, the discrete effect from changing the 
dummy from zero to one) on the probability of choosing the contract, evaluated at the sample mean. 
(5) "(dropped)" means that the fixed-effect is constrained to be zero to avoid the situation that the multinomial logit estimation result 
suffers from a perfect prediction problem when the variation of wage modes is insufficient for some crops and some villages. 
35 Table 8: Determinants of Contract Choice (Probit Estimation Results) 
[2] or [4] (in-kind wages) [3] or [4] (piece-rate wages) 
Coeff.  Std. Err.  dF/dx  Coeff.  Std. Err.  dF/dx 
Individual and household characteristics 
Female_labor  0.1321  (0.267)  0.0016  -0.2048 *  (0.125)  -0.0384 
Age_labor  -0.0044  (0.009)  -0.0001  -0.0020  (0.004)  -0.0004 
Educ_labor  -0.0491  (0.046)  -0.0006  -0.0384 *  (0.022)  -0.0072 
Land_labor  -0.1015 **  (0.046)  -0.0012  0.0202  (0.019)  0.0038 
S_labor  1.0195 **  (0.482)  0.0125  -0.5136 **  (0.247)  -0.0963 
Assets_labor  1.5812 *  (0.945)  0.0194  -0.4294  (0.617)  -0.0805 
Age_farmer  0.0051  (0.006)  0.0001  0.0066 **  (0.003)  0.0012 
Educ_farmer  0.0006  (0.032)  0.0000  0.0347 ***  (0.013)  0.0065 
Land_farmer  0.0627 ***  (0.020)  0.0008  0.0132 *  (0.008)  0.0025 
S_farmer  -0.4287  (0.292)  -0.0052  0.0893  (0.129)  0.0167 
Assets_farmer  -1.5712 ***  (0.476)  -0.0192  -0.2792  (0.113)  -0.0524 
Village fixed effects 
DELTA1  (dropped)  -0.4597 ***  (0.103)  -0.0731 
DRY1  2.3550 ***  (0.339)  0.2003  0.2357 **  (0.108)  0.0481 
DRY2  1.5976  (1.064)  0.1006  0.1090  (0.158)  0.0215 
DRY3  0.3659  (0.505)  0.0063  -0.1684  (0.139)  -0.0291 
HILL1  2.4904 ***  (0.405)  0.3463  -0.8311 ***  (0.172)  -0.1044 
HILL2  2.4916 ***  (0.385)  0.3961  -0.5908 ***  (0.205)  -0.0795 
COAST  3.0330 ***  (0.382)  0.5952  -0.1265  (0.194)  -0.0221 
Crop fixed effects 
Summer paddy  -0.4661 ***  (0.178)  -0.0041  0.0108  (0.078)  0.0020 
Upland paddy  1.1765 ***  (0.348)  0.0663  -0.5005  (0.564)  -0.0681 
Cereals  (dropped)  -0.3025  (0.292)  -0.0471 
Pulses  -1.3342  (0.885)  -0.0068  -0.2937 **  (0.144)  -0.0472 
Oilseeds  -2.1961 ***  (0.315)  -0.0155  -0.4766 ***  (0.130)  -0.0725 
Industrial crops  (dropped)  -0.1111  (0.277)  -0.0195 
Rubber  (dropped)  0.0233  (0.364)  0.0044 
Vegetables  (dropped)  -0.6706 ***  (0.124)  -0.0926 
Other crops  (dropped)  -0.3397  (0.370)  -0.0516 
Operation fixed effects 
Planting  (dropped)  0.2624  (0.214)  0.0517 
Middle  (dropped)  -0.4895 **  (0.227)  -0.0761 
Harvest  1.6847 ***  (0.146)  0.0316  0.1658  (0.214)  0.0317 
Intercept  -4.0203 ***  (0.474)  -0.8371 ***  (0.260) 
Wald chi2stat for zero slope  284.0 ***  386.3 *** 
Pseudo R2  0.504  0.208 
Log likelihood  -222.3  -1104.7 
Notes: See Table 7.

The number of observations used is 3100.
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Table 9: Determinants of Contract Choice (Robustness Check) 
A. Multinomial logit with three choices 
[2] or [4] (in-kind wages)  [3] (piece-rate in cash) 
Coeff.  Std. Err.  dF/dx  Coeff.  Std. Err.  dF/dx 
Female_labor  -0.5705  (0.395)  -0.0205  -0.4817 *  (0.286)  -0.0570 
Age_labor  -0.0088  (0.016)  -0.0003  -0.0042  (0.008)  -0.0005 
Educ_labor  -0.0498  (0.077)  -0.0016  -0.0742 *  (0.044)  -0.0090 
Land_labor  -0.0677  (0.064)  -0.0032  0.0570  (0.037)  0.0076 
S_labor  1.0582  (0.868)  0.0512  -1.1705 **  (0.532)  -0.1541 
Assets_labor  0.5850  (1.855)  0.0331  -1.4008  (1.463)  -0.1801 
Age_farmer  0.0126  (0.011)  0.0005  0.0078  (0.005)  0.0009 
Educ_farmer  -0.0064  (0.046)  -0.0006  0.0589 **  (0.024)  0.0075 
Land_farmer  0.0269  (0.032)  0.0009  0.0274 **  (0.014)  0.0033 
S_farmer  0.5912  (0.490)  0.0226  0.2977  (0.228)  0.0337 
Assets_farmer  -1.6767 **  (0.805)  -0.0664  -0.4646 **  (0.197)  -0.0478 
[2] (time wage in cash)  [3] or [4] (piece-rate wages) 
Coeff.  Std. Err.  dF/dx  Coeff.  Std. Err.  dF/dx 
Female_labor  -0.2845  (0.387)  -0.0048  -0.5094 *  (0.274)  -0.0694 
Age_labor  -0.0073  (0.017)  -0.0002  -0.0025  (0.008)  -0.0003 
Educ_labor  0.0047  (0.086)  0.0005  -0.0815 *  (0.043)  -0.0113 
Land_labor  -0.1164 *  (0.068)  -0.0030  0.0416  (0.038)  0.0062 
S_labor  1.4747 *  (0.827)  0.0403  -1.1000 **  (0.518)  -0.1585 
Assets_labor  1.0855  (2.034)  0.0291  -0.6861  (1.310)  -0.0995 
Age_farmer  -0.0051  (0.013)  -0.0002  0.0110 **  (0.005)  0.0015 
Educ_farmer  -0.0277  (0.061)  -0.0009  0.0602 **  (0.024)  0.0085 
Land_farmer  0.0646 **  (0.032)  0.0015  0.0259 *  (0.014)  0.0033 
S_farmer  1.0171 *  (0.576)  0.0239  0.1754  (0.224)  0.0201 
Assets_farmer  -1.8017  (1.157)  -0.0415  -0.5283 **  (0.200)  -0.0658 
B. Estimation using only employee data 
Multinomial logit  [2] Time wage in kind  [3] Piece rate in cash  [4] Piece rate in kind 
Coeff.  Std. Err.  dF/dx  Coeff.  Std. Err.  dF/dx  Coeff.  Std. Err.  dF/dx 
Female_labor  -0.1015  (0.385)  -0.0005  -0.4193  (0.288)  -0.0499  -0.9213  (1.528)  -0.0154 
Age_labor  0.0007  (0.018)  -0.0001  0.0118  (0.010)  0.0012  0.0984 *** (0.032)  0.0017 
Educ_labor  0.0302  (0.093)  0.0007  -0.0078  (0.047)  -0.0015  0.1408  (0.348)  0.0025 
Land_labor  -0.1158 *  (0.069)  -0.0027  0.0320  (0.039)  0.0057  -0.4449  (0.343)  -0.0081 
S_labor  1.3909 *  (0.869)  0.0344  -0.4982  (0.597)  -0.0743  2.3865  (1.952)  0.0438 
Assets_labor  1.3112  (2.081)  0.0300  -0.8118  (1.346)  -0.1350  10.2937 **  (4.668)  0.1874 
Probit  [2] or [4] (in-kind wages)  [3] or [4] (piece-rate wages) 
Coeff.  Std. Err.  dF/dx  Coeff.  Std. Err.  dF/dx 
Female_labor  0.0324  (0.236)  0.0005  -0.1666  (0.123)  -0.0165 
Age_labor  0.0037  (0.009)  0.0001  0.0054  (0.005)  0.0005 
Educ_labor  -0.0102  (0.048)  -0.0001  0.0009  (0.024)  0.0001 
Land_labor  -0.1173 **  (0.046)  -0.0017  0.0041  (0.021)  0.0004 
S_labor  1.1766 *** (0.454)  0.0172  -0.1172  (0.253)  -0.0116 
Assets_labor  1.8350 *  (0.915)  0.0268  -0.0564  (0.593)  -0.0056 
C. Estimation based on parsimonious specification# 
Multinomial logit  [2] Time wage in kind  [3] Piece rate in cash  [4] Piece rate in kind 
Coeff.  Std. Err.  dF/dx  Coeff.  Std. Err.  dF/dx  Coeff.  Std. Err.  dF/dx 
Female_labor  -0.1824  (0.498)  -0.0024  -0.5405 *  (0.284)  -0.0674  0.0045  (1.260)  0.0016 
Educ_labor  -0.0029  (0.084)  0.0003  -0.0920 **  (0.042)  -0.0112  -0.1359  (0.191)  -0.0022 
Land_labor  -0.1266 *  (0.077)  -0.0031  0.0224  (0.029)  0.0036  -0.1064  (0.219)  -0.0019 
S_labor  1.5135 *  (0.855)  0.0422  -1.4830 *** (0.482)  -0.1920  -0.1148  (1.983)  0.0013 
Age_farmer  0.0058  (0.011)  0.0001  0.0123 *** (0.005)  0.0015  0.0257  (0.017)  0.0004 
Educ_farmer  0.0159  (0.074)  0.0002  0.0475 **  (0.021)  0.0059  0.0104  (0.090)  0.0001 
Probit  [2] or [4] (in-kind wages)  [3] or [4] (piece-rate wages) 
Coeff.  Std. Err.  dF/dx  Coeff.  Std. Err.  dF/dx 
Female_labor  0.1087  (0.272)  0.0016  -0.2238 *  (0.128)  -0.0420 
Educ_labor  -0.0309  (0.043)  -0.0005  -0.0444 **  (0.022)  -0.0083 
Land_labor  -0.0744 *  (0.045)  -0.0011  0.0093  (0.014)  0.0017 
S_labor  0.9363 **  (0.453)  0.0141  -0.6213 *** (0.228)  -0.1167 
Age_farmer  0.0065  (0.005)  0.0001  0.0084 *** (0.002)  0.0016 
Educ_farmer  0.0022  (0.030)  0.0000  0.0273 **  (0.012)  0.0051 
Notes: In Parts A and B, all specifications include the same explanatory variables as in Tables 7 and 8. In Part C, out of the individual and 
household attributes in Tables 7 and 8, Age_labor and other non-significant village-, crop-, and operation-fixed effects were deleted from the 
model since they were not robustly significant. In Part C, only statistically significant coefficients are reported. 
37 Table 10: Determinants of the Man-Day Share of In-Kind Labor in Total Household Casual Farm Labor 
Weighted by the number of  Weighted by man-days  Weighted by earning in 
contracts per household  worked per household  Kyats per household 
Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
Estimated by OLS 
Household characteristics similar to those in Tables 7 to 9 # 
Female_labor ##  -0.0006  (0.013)  0.0041  (0.023)  0.0006  (0.014) 
Age_labor ##  0.0002  (0.000)  0.0002  (0.001)  -0.0001  (0.000) 
Educ_labor ##  0.0019  (0.002)  0.0040  (0.003)  0.0023  (0.002) 
Land_labor  -0.0029 **  (0.001)  -0.0029 **  (0.001)  -0.0020 *  (0.001) 
S_labor  0.0923 **  (0.037)  0.1474 **  (0.058)  0.1007 **  (0.041) 
Assets_labor  0.1348  (0.107)  0.2377  (0.192)  0.1747  (0.119) 
Additional household characteristics # 
No. of male children  0.0010  (0.006)  0.0087  (0.007)  0.0018  (0.006) 
No. of male adults  -0.0039  (0.008)  -0.0149 *  (0.009)  -0.0075  (0.008) 
No. of female children  -0.0076  (0.006)  -0.0142 *  (0.008)  -0.0100  (0.007) 
No. of female adults  0.0101  (0.008)  0.0136  (0.009)  0.0120  (0.009) 
Village fixed effects 
DRY1  0.0408 *** (0.014)  0.0650 *** (0.019)  0.0235 **  (0.010) 
DRY2  0.0005  (0.009)  0.0082  (0.014)  0.0030  (0.010) 
DRY3  0.0004  (0.007)  -0.0024  (0.008)  -0.0023  (0.006) 
HILL1  0.0479 *** (0.016)  0.0519 *** (0.019)  0.0434 ***  (0.017) 
HILL2  0.0762 *** (0.022)  0.1151 *** (0.037)  0.1039 ***  (0.036) 
COAST  0.1305 **  (0.059)  0.1247 **  (0.057)  0.1254 **  (0.059) 
Intercept  0.0038  (0.005)  0.0034  (0.005)  0.0033  (0.004) 
F(16,202)  2.78 ***  2.53 ***  2.20 *** 
R-squared  0.175  0.204  0.181 
Estimated by Double Censored Tobit 
Household characteristics similar to those in Tables 7 to 9 # 
Female_labor ##  0.4080 **  (0.173)  0.5029 **  (0.202)  0.4270 **  (0.176) 
Age_labor ##  -0.0012  (0.005)  -0.0014  (0.006)  -0.0021  (0.005) 
Educ_labor ##  0.0064  (0.015)  0.0114  (0.017)  0.0071  (0.015) 
Land_labor  -0.0851 *** (0.027)  -0.0968 *** (0.031)  -0.0802 ***  (0.026) 
S_labor  0.7249 **  (0.342)  0.9372 **  (0.394)  0.7351 **  (0.342) 
Assets_labor  0.6670  (0.687)  0.9473  (0.788)  0.7185  (0.685) 
Additional household characteristics # 
No. of male children  -0.0121  (0.047)  0.0012  (0.055)  -0.0070  (0.047) 
No. of male adults  0.0107  (0.057)  -0.0187  (0.067)  -0.0020  (0.057) 
No. of female children  -0.0382  (0.042)  -0.0572  (0.049)  -0.0397  (0.042) 
No. of female adults  0.0493  (0.045)  0.0606  (0.052)  0.0592  (0.045) 
Non-land hh. assets 
Village fixed effects (not reported: individually and jointly significant with the same signs as the OLS results)

chi2(16)  72.70 ***  76.97 ***  73.31 ***

Pseudo R2  0.391  0.388  0.398

Log likelihood  -56.73  -60.71  -55.51

Notes: # Deviations from the village means were employed in the regression. 
## These variables are characteristics of the head of the household. 
(1) The number of observations used is 219 (no sample households from village DELTA1 were included since no
incidence of in-kind wage was observed). Out of the 219 observations, 184 are left-censored at zero and 4 are right-
censored at one. 
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Figure 2: Optimal Contract Choice 
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